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This study examines the effect of shareholders’ personal taxes on bank risk-
taking. Economic theory predicts that personal tax rates affect individual investment 
risk-taking through risk sharing with the government via loss offsets. I investigate this 
relation using a sample of S corporation bank holding companies to isolate the effect of 
shareholder-level taxes and plausibly exogenous changes in dominant shareholders’ state 
income tax rates. I find that increases in shareholder tax rates are positively associated 
with bank risk-taking when shareholders can use loss offsets to share in risk with the 
government. This positive relation is concentrated in banks that have lower levels of 
capital, less external monitoring, few shareholder conflicts, and dominant shareholders 
who are also their bank’s CEO. However, in better-capitalized banks with less external 
monitoring and few shareholder conflicts, increases in shareholder tax rates are 
negatively associated with bank risk-taking when shareholders cannot share in risk with 
the government. Overall, the results suggest that investor-level taxes play an important 
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This study investigates the relation between shareholder taxes and bank risk-
taking. In light of concerns that taxation may have inadvertently exacerbated the 
financial crisis (e.g., Keen et al. 2010; Slemrod 2009), a burgeoning stream of studies 
explores the effect of taxes on bank risk-taking (e.g., de Mooji et al. 2013; Gallemore et 
al. 2017; Schepens 2016). Yet, while these studies enhance our understanding of how 
corporate-level taxes affect bank risk-taking, an important issue absent from this 
discussion is the role personal taxes play in these decisions. This is a significant 
omission given that individual shareholders shape their bank’s risk-taking decisions 
(e.g., Laeven and Levine 2009; Saunders et al. 1990) and economic theory that posits 
that personal taxes can lessen shareholders’ costs of risk-taking through risk-sharing 
with the government via loss offsets (Domar and Musgrave 1944). Thus, the same 
individual tax rate change could have different effects on bank risk-taking depending on 
shareholders’ ability to use loss offsets. Accordingly, understanding what role 
shareholders’ personal taxes play in bank risk-taking decisions has important fiscal and 
public policy implications. 
Studying this question is challenging, however, because the tax code generally 
provides individuals with few opportunities to share investment risk with the 
government to the extent prescribed by theory (i.e., with full loss offsets) (see Domar 
and Musgrave 1944; Langenmayr and Lester 2017). To overcome this issue, I exploit the 




status “pass-through” income, losses, and deductions to their individual shareholders 
who are then subject to tax only at the individual-level. Hence, this setting provides the 
potential for shareholder-level risk-sharing with the government via loss offsets and 
isolates individual-level taxes from corporate-level taxes. Additionally, because top tier 
bank holding companies (BHCs) file detailed ownership reports (FR Y-6, “Y-6” 
hereafter), this setting provides a rare opportunity to observe cross-sectional variation in 
shareholders’ personal tax rates and examine whether changes in these rates affect 
subsequent bank risk-taking.  
I employ a difference-in-differences framework using first differences and state-
by-year fixed effects based on the bank’s headquarter state (e.g., Ljungqvist et al. 2017). 
Importantly, this design mitigates the extent to which other contemporaneous bank-state 
economic conditions (e.g., concurrent corporate-level state tax rate changes or state-level 
investment opportunities) may influence my results. I focus on the dominant shareholder 
in each bank, as these individuals both affect firm financial policy (e.g., Cronqvist and 
Fahlenbrach 2008; Lin et al. 2012) and enjoy a greater degree of risk-sharing due to their 
greater ownership. I measure shareholders’ personal taxes by calculating changes in 
dominant shareholders’ maximum statutory state income tax rates based on their state of 
residence provided by the Y-6. In addition, I proxy for bank risk-taking using two 
measures: return on asset (ROA) volatility and Z-score (e.g., Houston et al. 2010; 
Laeven and Levine 2009; Mayberry et al. 2015). Specifically, ROA volatility captures 
the variance of returns to investment consistent with the risk construct in Domar and 




BHCs in my sample file unconsolidated (parent only) financial reports which restrict the 
breadth of my risk measures, so I match each BHC with its respective commercial 
bank(s) and examine changes in risk at the commercial bank-level. I also use coarsened 
exact matching (CEM) to ensure that treatment and control banks are similar on several 
observable dimensions (Iacus et al. 2012).  
Theory suggests that the relation between shareholder taxes and risk-taking rests 
on shareholders’ ability to share in risk with the government. For example, increases in 
shareholders’ personal taxes may increase bank risk-taking to the extent shareholders 
can use loss offsets because, by allowing the investor to deduct his investment losses 
from his other income, loss offsets reduce the after-tax risk of his returns and function as 
a form of insurance for risk-taking (Domar and Musgrave 1944; Mossin 1968; Stiglitz 
1969). As taxes increase, the value of this deduction increases, thereby incentivizing 
greater risk-taking. Without a loss offset, increases in shareholders’ personal tax rates 
may decrease bank risk-taking because the government takes a greater share of the 
investor’s profits, thereby reducing the marginal return to investment. I test the effect of 
shareholder taxes on bank risk-taking by using the passive activity loss limitations to 
classify shareholders according to their ability to use loss offsets.1 To the extent that 
investors’ personal income tax rates affect risk-taking decisions as theory predicts, I 
 
1 The passive activity loss limitations are complex, but generally allow shareholders to deduct their share 
of the firm’s losses to the extent the shareholder either materially participates in the firm or does not 
materially participate in the firm but has investment income from other passive activities. I explain these 




expect increases in shareholders’ personal tax rates to be positively (negatively) 
associated with bank risk-taking when shareholders can (cannot) use loss offsets.  
As a baseline analysis, I first estimate regressions of changes in bank risk on 
shareholder tax rate increases, regardless of the shareholder’s ability to use loss offsets, 
and tax rate decreases. I find a positive association between shareholder tax rate 
increases and subsequent year changes in ROA volatility and Z-score, but no evidence of 
a relation for tax rate decreases. To formally test my hypotheses, I next examine the 
association between shareholder tax rate changes and bank risk-taking after separately 
calculating tax rate increases for shareholders who can and cannot use loss offsets. I find 
a positive and significant relation between tax rate increases and ROA volatility and Z-
score for shareholders able to use loss offsets. This implies that shareholder tax rate 
increases are associated with increased risk-taking when dominant shareholders can 
share in risk with the government. In terms of economic significance, a one standard 
deviation increase in the tax rate for a shareholder able to use loss offsets is associated 
with an increase in ROA volatility and Z-score of about 0.55 percent and 8.92 percent of 
each measure’s mean, respectively. However, I find no evidence of a relation between 
bank risk-taking and either tax rate increases for shareholders who cannot use loss 
offsets or tax rate decreases.   
These tests implicitly assume that shareholders have the ability to influence their 
banks’ risk-taking decisions. I revisit this assumption by re-estimating my tests after 
separating tax rate increases for shareholders able to use loss offsets into those for CEOs 




responsive to changes in shareholder-CEOs’ personal taxes because these individuals 
control voting power and manage the bank’s operational decisions. However, despite not 
managing the bank’s operational decisions, non-CEO shareholders may also use their 
large blocks of voting power to influence the bank’s risk-taking decisions (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997). I find a positive and significant relation between ROA volatility and Z-
score and tax rate increases for shareholder-CEOs, but no evidence of relation for non-
CEO shareholders, although differences in coefficients are not statistically significant. 
Thus, results are consistent with the positive relation between shareholder taxes and 
bank risk-taking being driven by shareholders who have both significant influence over 
the bank’s operational decisions and the ability to share in losses with the government. 
In cross-sectional analysis, I investigate whether the relation between increases in 
shareholders state tax rates and bank risk-taking varies with monitoring by external 
auditors (Allen et al. 2011; Barton et al. 2014; Thakor 2012) and shareholder conflicts 
and portfolio diversification (Jacob and Michaely 2017; Faccio et al. 2011; Parrino 
2005). I find that the positive relation between shareholder tax rate increases and bank 
risk-taking is primarily concentrated in banks that have less capital and external 
monitoring, fewer shareholder conflicts, and a dominant shareholder who is also the 
bank’s CEO. In addition, although I fail to find a relation between tax rate increases and 
bank risk-taking, on average, for shareholders who cannot use loss offsets, I find 
evidence of a negative relation for better-capitalized banks and those that have less 
external monitoring and fewer shareholder conflicts.  




Specifically, because I focus on dominant shareholders of relatively small, closely-held 
banks, my findings may not generalize to settings with more diffuse ownership 
structures (e.g., publicly traded banks). In addition, given that the tax code prohibits 
shareholders of C corporations from offsetting corporate losses from ordinary income on 
their personal returns, my findings may not be descriptive of how shareholder taxes 
affect risk-taking in C corporations. Nevertheless, while my data have some limitations, 
they provide a rare opportunity to uncover new and important insights into an important 
and policy-relevant question. 
This study makes three contributions. First, this study contributes to the literature 
on the role of taxes in financial institutions. Although a growing stream of studies 
explores the effect of corporate taxes on bank risk-taking (e.g., de Mooij et al. 2013; 
Gallemore et al. 2017; Schepens 2016), little attention has been paid to the role of bank 
owners’ personal taxes in influencing these decisions. My findings suggest that increases 
in shareholders’ personal tax rates have an economically significant effect on bank risk-
taking, but the direction of this effect depends on shareholders’ ability to share in risk 
with the government and their control over the banks’ operational decisions. Moreover, 
my findings with respect to bank capitalization, shareholder conflicts, and external 
auditor monitoring suggest that the same individual-level tax rate changes may affect 
banks in drastically different ways depending on capital regulation, bank ownership 
structure, and voluntary external auditor requirements. This should be of particular 




Second and relatedly, this study contributes to the literature on the determinants 
of bank risk-taking. While prior research establishes that certain shareholders play an 
important role in shaping their bank’s risk-taking choices (e.g., Laeven and Levine 2009; 
Saunders et al. 1990), few studies consider how the personal financial incentives of these 
shareholders influence their decisions. My study fills this gap by examining shareholder-
level income taxes, a pervasive financial incentive that applies to nearly every 
individual. In contrast to risk-taking incentives that apply to only one type of shareholder 
(e.g., CEO compensation in Chen et al. 2006), personal taxes provide a rare opportunity 
to observe how different owners’ personal financial incentives affect bank risk. In doing 
so, my findings imply that interactive effects of ownership structure are not just limited 
to governance mechanisms within bank regulators’ control (e.g., capital regulation in 
Laeven and Levine 2009), but also encompass owners’ personal financial incentives set 
by external regulators (e.g., tax policy makers). 
Third, I contribute to prior research on taxes and firm risk-taking more broadly. 
Specifically, my findings that the effect of shareholders’ individual taxes on bank risk-
taking depends on individual-level risk sharing with the government complements 
evidence in Langenmayr and Lester (2017), who find similar results with respect to 
corporate taxes and loss offset rules in non-financial firms. Thus, from a tax policy 
perspective, my findings suggest that restricting the ability of shareholders to use losses 
(e.g., through passive activity loss limitations) may have negative implications for firm 
risk-taking. While related work by Armstrong et al. (2019) also examines the relation 




shareholder-level taxes in banks and investigate how this relation varies with shareholder 
conflicts, portfolio diversification, bank capital, and external monitoring. I discuss these 
differences in greater detail in Section 2. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews prior research 
and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the setting, data, sample, and research 
design and Section 4 discusses the main results and cross-sectional analyses. Section 5 





2. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1. Overview of Literature on Taxes and Risk-Taking 
A long stream of research explores the relation between taxes and risk-taking. 
Early theoretical work on portfolio choice (e.g., Domar and Musgrave 1944; Mossin 
1968; Stiglitz 1969) proposes that an increase in personal taxes encourages risk-averse 
investors to increase risk-taking if the government provides a full loss offset. In other 
words, by reducing investors’ taxable income by the entire amount of the investment 
loss, a full loss offset effectively compensates investors for the reduction of returns 
caused by the increase in tax rates, thereby encouraging greater risk-taking.  
Two recent studies build upon Domar and Musgrave’s (1944) theory by 
examining how corporate tax rules affects firm risk-taking. For example, Langenmayr 
and Lester (2017) provide theoretical and empirical evidence that longer tax loss offset 
periods are associated with greater risk-taking. Further, Langenmayr and Lester (2017) 
find that taxes increase (weakly decrease) firm risk-taking when firms are able (unable) 
to use loss offsets, suggesting that risk-sharing with the government induces firms to 
take on greater risk, consistent with Domar and Musgrave 1944. In related work, 
Ljungqvist et al. (2017) use changes in U.S. corporate state taxes as plausibly exogenous 
shocks and find that increases in corporate tax rates are associated with reduced firm 
risk-taking. However, Ljungqvist et al. (2017) find that this negative effect is partially 
moderated by the ability of the firm to offset losses through tax loss carrybacks and 




In addition to the literature on taxes and public firm risk-taking, several studies 
investigate the effect of taxes on bank risk-taking specifically, albeit from different 
perspectives. For example, Mayberry et al. (2015) find that S corporation banks engage 
in less risk-taking relative to C corporation banks, suggesting that tax-motivated 
organizational structures influence bank risk. Other work suggests that corporate taxes 
affect bank risk-taking through the effect of taxes on bank capital structure. Schepens 
(2016) finds that higher tax rates are associated with greater aggregate bank leverage, 
which in turn, is associated with a greater likelihood of financial crisis. In addition, 
Gallemore et al. (2017) argue that corporate taxes may directly affect bank risk-taking, 
but this relation varies with economic conditions. Gallemore et al. (2017) find that 
during economic expansions (recessions), corporate tax rate changes are associated with 
increases (decreases) in bank risk-taking but find no evidence of a relation on average.  
While the research above suggests that corporate taxes affect firm risk-taking 
broadly, and to a more nuanced or indirect extent, bank risk-taking specifically, two 
recent studies suggest personal tax considerations may also be important. Yost (2018) 
finds a negative relation between CEO’s unrealized capital gain tax burdens and firm 
risk-taking, suggesting that CEOs reduce firm risk-taking when they are overexposed to 
firm risk. In related work on the effect of CEOs’ personal taxes on risk-taking in large, 
public firms, Armstrong et al. (2019) find that CEOs’ taxes are positively associated with 
idiosyncratic risk, consistent with taxes reducing risk-averse CEOs’ disincentive for 
risky investment. However, in firms where the CEO’s economic incentives are aligned 




find no evidence of a relation between CEOs’ taxes and firm risk-taking.2  
My study is similar to Armstrong et al. (2019) in that I also investigate the 
relation between individual-level income taxes and firm risk-taking. However, my study 
differs in that I focus on banks—which substantially differ from non-financial firms in 
terms of risk-taking incentives, governance models, and moral hazard issues (see Laeven 
2013)—and risk-sharing through the operation of the loss offset rules, rather than as a 
function of the progressivity of individual income taxes.3 In contrast to CEOs’ personal 
taxes (e.g., Armstrong et al. 2019), which are unaffected by corporate losses, 
shareholders’ personal taxes can lessen some of the cost of bank risk-taking borne by 
shareholders. In addition, I examine a variety of shareholder roles (e.g., CEOs and non-
CEO executives and employees), and show how conflicts among a firm’s shareholder 
base, shareholder diversification, bank capital, and external monitoring interact with 
shareholder taxes to affect bank risk-taking. Ultimately, I view my study as providing 
distinct, yet also complementary evidence to Armstrong et al. (2019). 
 
 
2 Theoretically, the effect of CEO delta is ambiguous, as it may incentivize or discourage risk-taking (e.g., 
see Armstrong et al. 2013). However, Armstrong et al. (2019) find theoretical and empirical evidence that 
the negative effect dominates.  
3 Specifically, CEOs in Armstrong et al. (2019) are limited in their ability to deduct losses because they 
are employees of the firm (and corporate losses are not deductible by employees). However, as 
Langenmayr and Lester (2017) show, in the absence of loss offsets, increases in tax rates increase risk-
taking only if the CEO is very risk averse (see footnote 8 on page 13 of Langenmayr and Lester (2017). 
Given the difficulty in empirically measuring risk aversion, I only assume shareholders are risk-averse in 




2.2. Hypothesis Development 
As key equity suppliers and residual claimants of the bank, shareholders have 
both economic incentives to encourage risk-taking that maximizes bank value and the 
ability to align bank policy with their incentives through monitoring, managing the bank, 
or controlling significant voting power (e.g., Laeven and Levine 2009; Saunders et al. 
1990; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). For example, by managing the bank’s day-to-day 
operations, shareholders who also serve as top executives can align the operational 
decisions of the bank with their own incentives (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Saunders et 
al. 1990). However, even without a formal role in the organization, shareholders may 
affect bank decision-making by voting on changes to the bank’s structure or policies, 
through discussions with management (Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach 2008), or by 
influencing the agenda of and topics discussed during board meetings (Chase 2019). 
Collectively, this suggests that shareholders have the ability to change their bank’s risk-
taking decisions in response to their personal tax incentives. 
However, whether shareholders use their influence to change bank risk-taking in 
response to changes in their personal taxes is unclear, ex ante. On one hand, to the extent 
the shareholder can fully deduct losses from his income, an increase in individual 
income tax rates may incentivize him to increase firm risk (Domar and Musgrave 1944). 
In other words, because the government allows the shareholder to deduct losses resulting 
from risky investment directly from his income, the shareholder can reduce his current 
or future tax liability by the product of the loss and the tax rate. When tax rates increase, 




returns and results in the government effectively becoming a partner in the risky 
investment by sharing in both gains and losses with the investor (Domar and Musgrave 
1944; Langenmayr and Lester 2017).4 Thus, to the extent shareholder can offset losses, 
increases in shareholders’ personal taxes may be positively associated with bank risk-
taking. I state this in the alternative, as follows: 
H1a: Shareholders’ personal tax rate increases are positively associated with 
bank risk-taking to the extent shareholders can offset losses. 
 
On the other hand, if the shareholder can cannot deduct losses, risk sharing with 
the government is reduced (Domar and Musgrave 1944). In this case, when taxes 
increase, the government will take a greater share of the shareholder’s income, but will 
not share in the losses arising from risky investment (Langenmayr and Lester 2017).5 
Consequently, a shareholder may reduce bank risk-taking to minimize the reduction in 
his after-tax returns. Thus, if shareholders are limited in their ability to deduct losses, the 
relation between their personal income taxes and bank risk-taking may be negative. I 
state this in the alternative, as follows: 
H1b: Shareholders’ personal tax rate increases are negatively associated 
with bank risk-taking to the extent shareholders cannot offset losses. 
 
However, there are several reasons why shareholder taxes may have little effect 
on bank risk-taking. First, coordination issues among shareholders or heterogeneity in 
shareholders’ tax preferences may create conflicts of interest between shareholders. 
 
4 Specifically, Domar and Musgrave (1944) posit that without a loss offset, a tax rate increase reduces the 
yield of the investment, but has no effect on the degree of risk, thereby decreasing the compensation per 
unit of risk-taking. In contrast, a tax rate increase with a full loss offset reduces both the yield and the risk 
of the investment by the tax rate and therefore does not affect the return per unit of risk-taking. 
5 As Langenmayr and Lester (2017) note, the effect of increases in taxes on risk-taking when there is no 




This, in turn, may mute a firm’s sensitivity to changes in shareholder taxes (Jacob and 
Michaely 2017; Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Second, shareholders’ ability to diversify 
their portfolios lessens their exposure to firm-specific firm, and consequently, their 
sensitivity to personal taxes (Yost 2018). Third, bank capital plays a key role in 
supporting the bank’s risk-taking appetite (Matten 2000). Thus, to the extent certain 
banks (e.g., S corporations) are limited in their ability to raise external capital and take 
on greater risk (Mayberry et al. 2015), this may reduce the extent to which the bank may 
increase risk-taking in response to their shareholders’ personal taxes. Finally, monitoring 
mechanisms such as director stock ownership guidelines (e.g., Bhagat and Bolton 2019) 





3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1. Setting 
I exploit the unique tax characteristics and rich ownership data available for 
BHCs organized as S corporations, as this setting provides several empirical advantages. 
S corporations are corporations that elect to be treated as flow-through entities under 
Subchapter S of the IRC.6 In contrast to C corporations, which are taxed first on profits 
at the corporate level and then again at the shareholder-level once these profits are 
distributed, S corporations effectively escape double taxation by “passing through” 
income, losses, deductions, and credits to their shareholders, who are then subject to tax 
only at individual ordinary income rates. Thus, by removing the influence of double 
taxation, the S corporation setting mitigates the extent to which my results may be 
attributable to corporate-level tax policy changes, rather than shareholder-level taxes.7 In 
addition, because shareholders of S corporations can generally also use their pro-rata 
share of the corporation’s losses to offset other personal income, subject to certain 
limitations, the S corporation setting more closely approximates a full loss offset, an 
important component in the theoretical relation between personal taxes and risk-taking.  
This setting also offers a rare opportunity to observe cross-sectional variation in 
shareholders’ states of residence, tax-status, and personal income tax rates. Specifically, 
 
6 To qualify for the S corporation election, a corporation must be incorporated domestically, and have only 
one class of stock, only individual and tax-exempt shareholders (e.g., trusts, estates, and employee stock 
ownership plans), and a maximum of 100 shareholders. 
7 In some instances, states may also tax S corporations (e.g., franchise taxes). However, the inclusion of 
headquarters state by year fixed effects in my analyses largely mitigates the influence of contemporaneous 




all top-tier BHCs file FR Y-6 with the Federal Reserve each year. This form contains the 
name, city, state, and percentage of voting ownership in the BHC for shareholders who 
own five percent or more of any class of voting securities. In addition, the Y-6 contains 
each insider’s name, city, state, principal occupation, and percentage of voting 
ownership and role in the BHC, bank subsidiaries, and other businesses.8, 9 Thus, this 
setting enables me to match shareholders to their respective banks and investigate how 
changes in shareholder tax rates affect banks’ subsequent risk-taking decisions. See 
Appendix B for an example of a Y-6. 
3.2. Data and Sample 
I use bank financial data from the Federal Reserve’s dataset of Reports of 
Condition and Income (call reports), Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding 
Companies (FR Y-9C), Parent Only Financial Statements for Small Holding Companies 
(FR Y-9SP), ownership and insider information from Y-6s provided by SNL, state tax 
rate and S election conformity information from CCH’s State Tax Handbook and the Tax 
Foundation, county-level unemployment and CPI inflation adjustment data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), county-level population, wages, and personal income 
data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and compensation data from 
PayScale.com and Indeed.com. To derive my sample, I begin with all Y-6s in the SNL 
database from 2002 through 2014. My sample begins in 2002 because this is the first 
 
8 For purposes of the Y-6, an insider is a principal securities holder, director, trustee, partner, executive 
officer, or person with similar functions. A principal securities holder is an individual who directly or 
indirectly controls 10 percent or more of the voting power of a member bank or company.  
9 Specifically, the Y-6 requires that the BHC provide the name and job title for any company for which an 
insider is a director, trustee, partner, or executive officer and the name and ownership for any company in 




year for which SNL has Y-6s widely available in its database and ends in 2014 to allow 
sufficient time for a risk-taking response. The Y-6 is not machine-readable, so I hand-
collect a stratified random sample of Y-6s using the Cochran (1977) formula to 
determine the optimal sample size for my risk measures, similar to Xie (2016).10, 11  
To maximize the power of the risk measures available for my analyses, I match 
each Y-6 with call report data for its respective commercial bank(s) and examine risk-
taking at the bank-level.12 I require all bank-year observations have data necessary for 
my control variables and correspond to an S corporation BHC that does not convert to a 
C corporation in later years. To mitigate the effects of bank acquisitions on my results, I 
require all bank-year observations have quarterly asset growth not exceeding 10 percent 
in that year (Cornett et al. 2011). I also eliminate bank-year observations where the bank 
does not appear to have a CEO per its Y-6, dominant shareholder information is 
redacted, or the dominant shareholder lives in a state that does not conform to the 
 






 , where n is the sample size, t is the t-value for a 
particular confidence level, P is the bank-year-level average of each risk measure based on all banks with 
a top-tier S corporation BHC in a given year, Q = 1 – P, d is the margin of error, and N is the total number 
of banks with a top-tier S corporation BHC in a given year. I set t equal to 1.96 and d equal to 0.05, such 
that for each bank-year, I am 95% confident that the value of each risk measure in the stratified random 
sample will differ from the mean risk measure for the population of banks with top-tier S corporation 
BHCs in a given year by more than 0.05 less than 5% of the time. I employ two measures of bank risk-
taking, so I estimate the Cochran formula for each risk measure and use the highest sample size computed 
for each year (Cochran 1977, 81). I use each bank-year as a stratum. 
11 Specifically, I use a combination of ABBYY Flexi-Capture, Python, and manual hand-collection to 
transform Items 3 and 4 from the Y-6s into machine readable data. Some information does not tie between 
Item 3 and Item 4, so I manually inspect and reconcile all hand-collected data. As some banks manually 
redact certain information on the Y-6s, I use Y-6s in nearby years to ensure the data is complete. However, 
in rare instances that key information necessary for my analyses is missing from Item 3 and Item 4, I 
exclude these Y-6s from my sample. 
12 Approximately 85 percent of my sample files FR Y-9SP, rather than FR Y-9C. As a condensed version 
of the Y-9C, FR Y-9SP provides limited financial information for the parent entity only. Thus, examining 





Federal passive loss rules and does not either recognize the Federal S election or provide 
a state-specific S election.13 Finally, I drop any bank-year observations where the 
dominant shareholder changes or changes roles (e.g., is the CEO and chairman of the 
BHC in one year and only the chairman the following year), or the dominant shareholder 
moves to a different state. My final sample consists of 3,321 bank-years from 2003 
through 2014, corresponding to 683 unique banks, 584 unique BHCs, and 650 unique 
dominant shareholders.  
3.3. Measure of Shareholder Tax Rate Changes 
I focus on dominant shareholders when computing changes in shareholder tax 
rates because these individuals both enjoy a greater degree of risk-sharing due to their 
higher ownership and have economically significant effects on firm financial policy 
(e.g., Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach 2008; Lin et al. 2012). I identify the dominant 
shareholder in each bank using voting power listed on the Y-6.14 As a large portion of my 
sample has family ownership, I follow Anderson and Reeb (2003) and compute the total 
ownership for all members of the family. Because the overwhelming majority of banks 
do not identify familial relations, I utilize bank websites, local newspaper articles, and 
other public information searches to determine relations between bank owners. If two or 
 
13 Subsidiary banks may also elect S corporation status provided they satisfy certain requirements (e.g., the 
subsidiary is 100 percent owned by BHC). In general, almost all BHCs in my sample also elect S 
corporation status for their subsidiaries. Nonetheless, because certain tax rules concerning flow-through of 
the subsidiary bank’s assets, liabilities, income, and deductions differ for S corporation BHCs with C 
corporation subsidiaries relative to S corporation BHCs with qualified subchapter-S subsidiaries, I re-
estimate my analyses after excluding the former and obtain similar results (untabulated). 
14 Although S corporations are prohibited from having more than one class of stock, they can issue stocks 
with different voting rights. To my knowledge, no bank in my sample has a class of stock with different 




more owners have the most voting power in the BHC, I assume that the dominant owner 
is the one with the highest role, using the 2017 Robert Half Salary Guide for Accounting 
and Finance to rank each role. 
To measure dominant shareholders’ personal tax rates, I hand-collect maximum 
statutory state tax rates on ordinary income from CCH’s State Tax Handbook and the Tax 
Foundation.15 Using each shareholder’s state of residence listed on the Y-6 and a filing 
status of married filing jointly, I calculate changes in each shareholder’s tax rate, and 
classify these changes as increases or decreases.16 To the extent that the dominant 
shareholder is non-taxable for federal tax purposes (e.g., a foundation), I compute these 
owners' tax rates using the state rate, if any, applicable to each type of entity. Thus, 
shareholder taxes vary cross-sectionally based on shareholders’ tax status and state of 
residence, and temporally with plausibly exogenous changes in these rates over my 
sample period.  
 
15 I use statutory tax rates because recent survey evidence suggests that corporate executives use statutory 
rather than marginal tax rates (Graham et al. 2017). In addition, although many of the top tax brackets for 
shareholders in my sample correspond to relatively low taxable income (e.g., Illinois, Iowa, and Missouri), 
in Appendix B, I validate that the maximum statutory state income tax rate is largely representative of 
shareholders in my sample. 
16 FR Y-6 requires that the bank list each shareholder’s or insider’s state, but does not specify whether this 
refers to the state of residence or the state of employment. I assume this is the shareholder’s state of 
residence for two reasons. First, where the shareholder lives in the same state as the bank, the difference 
would be negligible. However, in cases where the shareholder lives in a different state than the bank, 
typically these shareholders’ states are several states away from where the bank is headquartered and in 
states where the bank does not have any branches (e.g., for a bank headquartered in Illinois, a shareholder 
may live in Florida). Second, I randomly sample the Y-6s that list their shareholders’ full addresses and 
use Google Maps to verify that these addresses correspond to personal residences, rather than the bank. As 
almost all of these addresses correspond to homes and apartment complexes, treating the state listed on the 




3.4. Measures of Bank Risk-Taking 
I proxy for bank risk-taking using two measures commonly used in prior 
research: return on asset volatility (ROAV) and Z-score (ZSCORE) (e.g., Houston et al. 
2010; Laeven and Levine 2009; Mayberry et al. 2015). To capture the volatility of 
accounting earnings to investment consistent with the risk construct in Domar and 
Musgrave (1944), I use return on asset volatility (ROAV), computed as the natural 
logarithm of the standard deviation of seasonally adjusted quarterly pre-tax ROA. As a 
measure of bank solvency risk and distance to default, Z-score is computed as the natural 
logarithm of the sum of average return on assets (ROA) and average Tier 1 capital, 
scaled by ROAV and multiplied by negative one. I measure both measures over the four 
quarters in year t (e.g., Bouwman and Malmendier 2015; Shim 2013).17 Higher (lower) 
values of ROAV and ZSCORE suggest greater (less) risk-taking, respectively.  
3.5. Empirical Model 
To estimate the effect of shareholder taxes on banks’ risk-taking choices, I 
employ a difference-in-differences design using staggered changes in shareholder state 
income taxes, similar to the approach used in prior research (e.g., Heider and Ljungqvist 
2015; Ljungqvist et al. 2017). My baseline regression is as follows: 
 
17 Prior research (e.g., Berger et al. 2017; Ljungqvist et al. 2017; Yost 2018) calculates ROA volatility 
using quarterly data over a three-year period from t to t+2. However, because many banks in my sample 
experience consecutive shareholder tax rate changes within the three-year period from t to t+2 and because 
sample banks elect to become S corporations at different points in time, I use an annual measure to 
mitigate the influence of multiple-year tax rate changes and the possibility that changes in organization 
structure affect the construction of my measures. Consistent with multi-year tax rate changes or timing 
differences in S corporation conversions inducing noise, I find no evidence that changes in ROA volatility 
or Z-score are associated with shareholder tax rate increases or decreases when I compute these measures 




ΔRISKit+1 = β0 + β1INCREASEit + β1DECREASEit + βkΔCONTROLSit + 
STATE*YEAR FE + εit, (1) 
where subscripts i and t represent banks and years, respectively, ΔRISK refers to changes 
in the risk-taking measures described above (first difference), INCREASE (DECREASE) 
represents increases (decreases) in shareholders’ maximum state statutory income tax 
rates, and STATE*YEAR FE is based on the state of the bank’s headquarters and removes 
time-varying state economic shocks by comparing treatment and control banks in the 
same state at the same point in time (second difference).  
Importantly, this design aids a causal interpretation by identifying plausible 
counterfactuals. That is, under certain identifying assumptions, this design enables me to 
compare risk changes of banks whose shareholders experience a tax rate change to risk 
changes of banks in the same state and year whose shareholders do not experience a tax 
rate change. To illustrate my research design, assume two banks are both headquartered 
in Iowa and the dominant shareholder of one bank lives in Iowa while the dominant 
shareholder of the other bank lives in Minnesota. In 2013, Minnesota increased its 
individual income tax rate from 7.85 percent to 9.85 percent. My research design 
compares the subsequent risk change from 2013 to 2014 for the bank whose shareholder 
lives in Minnesota with contemporaneous risk changes for the bank whose shareholder 
lives in Iowa. Thus, by holding the state of the bank’s headquarters constant, this design 
also mitigates the extent to which other contemporaneous bank-state economic 
conditions (e.g., concurrent state-level taxes or state-specific investment opportunities) 




 Theory suggests that the relation between personal taxes and risk-taking depends 
upon shareholders’ ability to use losses to offset other income (Domar and Musgrave 
1944; Langenmayr and Lester 2017). Specific to my setting, shareholders can deduct 
their pro-rata share of the firm’s losses from their other personal income if they satisfy 
three sequential tests: the basis limitations (IRC §1366), the “at risk” limitations (IRC 
§465), and the passive activity loss rules (IRC §469).18 Although I cannot observe 
whether shareholders meet the basis or at risk limitations, Y-6 information on 
shareholders’ roles within the bank and outside ownership interests enables me to test 
my hypotheses by exploiting variation in loss offsets under the passive activity loss 
rules.  
In general, a taxpayer’s income falls into one of two mutually exclusive 
categories: active and passive. Active (passive) income arises from a trade or business in 
which the taxpayer materially participates (does not materially participate) on a regular, 
continuous, and substantial basis, respectively. Under the passive loss rules, a bank 
shareholder generally can offset other active income with bank losses if the shareholder 
either 1) materially participates in the bank or 2) does not materially participate but has 
income from other passive (non-bank) activities. Using Y-6 information, I classify 
 
18 The basis limitation rules under §1366(d) require shareholders have a stock basis in excess of the 
amount of their pro-rata loss at the end of the tax year. Assuming this test is met, shareholders are then 
subject to the “at risk” limitations under IRC §465(b). That is, shareholders are allowed to deduct the loss 
only up to the amount of money and adjusted basis of property contributed to the S corporation by the 
shareholder and any amount loaned by the shareholder to the S corporation. Finally, under the passive 
activity loss rules of IRC §469, the shareholder must materially participate in the trade or business on a 
“regular, continuous, and substantial” basis (§469(h)(1)). To the extent the loss is disallowed under either 
the at-risk or the passive activity rules, the loss can be carried forward and deducted in a subsequent year 




shareholders as being able to use loss offsets if they either 1) work for the bank as 
executives, officers, or other employees or 2) do not hold a role or hold only a limited 
role within the bank, but have other passive investments outside of the bank. I consider 
all other shareholders unable to use loss offsets.19, 20 I separately calculate tax rate 
increases for shareholders who can use loss offsets (INCREASE_OFFSET) and those 
unable to use loss offsets (INCREASE_NOOFFSET). I also include tax rate decreases 
(DECREASE) to allow for possible asymmetry in the effect of shareholder taxes on bank 
risk-taking (e.g., Ljungqvist et al. 2017). I then estimate the following model: 
ΔRISKit+1 = β0 + β1INCREASE_OFFSETit + β2INCREASE_NOOFFSETit + 
β3DECREASEit +βkΔCONTROLSit + STATE*YEAR FE + εit, (2) 
Following prior research (e.g., Cantrell and Yust 2018), I also include a vector of 
bank-specific financial characteristics that may affect bank risk-taking. Specifically, I 
include bank size (SIZE), the square of bank size (SIZE²), and loan portfolio size 
(LOANS) to control for the possibility that banks with greater resources and different 
 
19 IRC §469 does not formally define what constitutes material participation, but Reg. §1.469-5T provides 
seven tests to determine whether a taxpayer materially participates in a trade or business. This includes 
that the taxpayer participated in the business for more than 500 hours during the tax year or participated in 
the activity for more than 100 hours during the tax year and at least as much as any other individual. Thus, 
I consider all shareholders who only serve as a member of the board of directors or chairman of the board 
to be passively involved in the bank because these individuals generally spend approximately 250 hours a 
year in their duties (McCormick 2019), which, while over 100 hours, would likely not be at least as much 
as any other individual within the bank.  
20 Despite their lack of a formal role in the organization, shareholders who do not have the ability to use 
loss offsets still appear to have significant influence on the firm’s business decisions. For example, the 
average dominant shareholder in my sample who does not work for the business controls approximately 
40 percent of the bank (untabulated). In addition, many of these shareholders are also founders and/or 
retired executives or directors of the firm who have left the day-to-day operations of the bank to their 
children, but still have the ability to influence bank decisions. Conversations with a CFO of an S 





asset mixes have different risk-taking opportunities and NPL to capture realized 
economic losses in the bank’s loan portfolio. I also control for bank performance by 
including the net interest margin on interest bearing assets (NIM). In addition, the Tier 1 
capital ratio (TIER1) controls for bank capitalization. To control for the possibility that 
changes in the bank’s governance structure may influence bank risk-taking (e.g., Pathan 
2009), I include the number of directors on the board (BDSIZE) and an indicator for 
whether the CEO also serves as the chairman of the board (CEOCHAIR). I also control 
for any contemporaneous changes in the dominant shareholder’s ownership (SHOWN), 
as large changes in ownership rights may affect shareholders’ ability to influence their 
bank’s risk-taking.  
Although interacted state-by-year fixed effects largely control for state economic 
trends in a given year, I also include several county-level economic variables that may 
affect bank risk-taking at the local-level. This includes personal income per capita 
(PERSINC), unemployment (UNEMP) and the total population in the county (TOTPOP), 
all based on the county of the bank’s headquarters. To mitigate the risk of outliers 
influencing the results, I winsorize continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. I 
cluster standard errors by dominant shareholder and use CEM in my tests to ensure that 




Balsmeier et al. 2017; Gallemore et al. 2019; Iacus et al. 2012).21 Appendix A provides 
detailed variable definitions. 
 
21 In contrast to other matching methods such as propensity score matching, which matches treatment 
firms to a specific number of control firms, coarsened exact matching focuses on minimizing differences 
among covariates without regard to the number of matches. To mitigate over-controlling and 
dimensionality issues and maximize my sample, I match on changes in SIZE and SIZE² (given that these 
variables are correlated with most variables in my tests) and the bank’s headquarters state (to ensure paired 
treatment and control banks share similar state-level economic conditions). However, as discussed in 




4. UNIVARIATE STATISTICS AND RESULTS 
 
4.1 Geographical Distribution of Sample 
Table 4.1 provides the number and percent of banks and shareholders by state in 
my sample. Based on the bank’s headquarters location, banks in my sample are 
headquartered in 35 different states, with all Federal Reserve branches except 
Philadelphia represented.22 In terms of shareholders’ states, shareholders in my sample 
live in 40 different states, with Iowa, Illinois, and Minnesota occurring most frequently. 
In approximately 10 percent of the sample (334 bank-year observations), the dominant 
shareholder resides outside of the bank’s headquarters state (untabulated). Overall, my 
sample appears to provide a wide cross-section of geographic regions and tax 




22 While requiring banks have shareholders located in states that recognize the S corporation election and 
the Federal passive activity loss limitations increases identification of the effect of personal taxes on bank 
risk-taking, this design choice also reduces variation in bank- and shareholder-states. For example, before 
sample restrictions, there are 41 different states with at least one bank and 46 different states with at least 
one dominant shareholder in my sample. In addition, although states in the northeastern portion of the U.S. 
(e.g., Maine, New York, and Pennsylvania) are not widely represented in my sample, these states also tend 




Table 4.1 Banks by Headquarters’ State and Shareholder State of Residence 
 Bank State Shareholder State 
State # of Bank-Years % of Bank-Years # of Bank-Years % of Bank-Years 
AK 3 0 3 0 
AL 70 2 68 2 
AR 74 2 74 2 
AZ 7 0 17 1 
CA 45 1 57 2 
CO 69 2 71 2 
CT 12 0 12 0 
FL 44 1 89 3 
GA 55 2 57 2 
IA 544 16 510 15 
ID 0 0 8 0 
IL 489 15 441 13 
IN 20 1 27 1 
KS 151 5 149 4 
KY 99 3 97 3 
MD 6 0 6 0 
ME 0 0 1 0 
MI 2 0 2 0 
MN 355 11 360 11 
MO 234 7 218 7 
MT 76 2 79 2 
NC 0 0 5 0 
ND 62 2 62 2 
NE 114 3 133 4 
NM 85 3 82 2 
NV 1 0 28 1 
NY 2 0 6 0 
OH 15 0 18 1 
OK 166 5 147 4 
OR 10 0 3 0 
SC 2 0 2 0 
SD 30 1 30 1 
TX 229 7 214 6 
UT 17 1 17 1 
VA 0 0 11 0 
VT 0 0 11 0 
WA 16 0 28 1 
WI 159 5 147 4 
WV 5 0 5 0 
WY 53 2 26 1 





4.2 Magnitude of State Tax Rate Changes 
I next report on the prevalence and magnitude of state tax rate increases and 
decreases in my sample. As shown in Appendix D and E, my sample includes 20 state 
tax rate increases in 16 states and 34 state tax rate decreases in 19 states. The average tax 
increase raises rates by 96 basis points while the average tax decrease lowers rates by 55 
basis points. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the geographical dispersion of tax rate changes 
in my sample. In general, tax rate changes in my sample are geographically dispersed, 
with both tax rate increases and decreases spanning most major portions of the U.S. 
Table 4.2 presents the distribution of my sample by year. Each year of my 
sample is fairly well represented, with each accounting for at least five percent of all 
bank-year observations in my sample. Table 4.3 provides additional information on the 
number and type of shareholders in my sample and their tax rate changes. In about 95 
percent (five percent) of bank-years, the dominant shareholder can (cannot) use loss 
offsets. Of the shareholders who can use loss offsets, approximately 77 percent also 
serve as the bank’s CEO while the remaining 23 percent are non-CEO executives, 
employees, or shareholders without a formal role in the bank. Shareholder tax rate 
increases occur in approximately five percent of bank-year observations in my sample, 
with five percent (four percent) of bank-years involving tax rate increases for 
shareholders who can (cannot) use loss offsets. In contrast, about seven percent of the 




Figure 4.1 Geography of State Tax Rate Increases by Shareholder State  
 












          Tax Rate Increases, 2003 - 2008                                                        Tax Rate Increases, 2009 - 2014 
 















Figure 4.2 Geography of State Tax Rate Decreases by Shareholder State  
 






















Table 4.2 Observations by Year 
Year # of Bank-Years % of Bank-Years 
2003 156 5 
2004 208 6 
2005 225 7 
2006 256 8 
2007 257 8 
2008 284 9 
2009 312 9 
2010 368 11 
2011 362 11 
2012 322 10 
2013 310 9 
2014 261 8 















 All Shareholders 
Total N = 3,321 
Loss Offset 
Total N = 3,162 
No Loss Offset 
Total N = 159 
CEO 
Total N = 2,431 
Non-CEO 
Total N = 731 
Item Mean ∆ N Mean ∆ N Mean ∆ N Mean ∆ N Mean ∆ N 
State tax increase 1.27% 172 1.28% 166 0.80% 6 1.25% 128 1.43% 38 
State tax decrease 0.60% 234 0.60% 230 0.83% 4 0.57% 168 0.66% 62 
33 
 
4.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.4 presents descriptive statistics of the raw values of variables in my 
analyses. The average bank in my sample has ROA volatility of -6.07, a Z-score of -
3.83, non-performing loans of 1.6 percent, and assets of approximately $105 million, 
similar to prior research (Cantrell and Yust 2018; Mayberry et al. 2015). With average 
ROA of 0.012 and an average Tier 1 capital ratio of 10 percent, banks in my sample are 
profitable and well capitalized. Additionally, dominant shareholders control an average 
of 66 percent of the voting power in the BHC, which is consistent with prior research 
(Hope et al. 2011) and suggests these shareholders have significant influence relative to 
other bank shareholders. Moreover, dominant shareholders possess an average of two 
other ownership interests outside of the bank, suggesting these individuals are also 
somewhat diversified. Finally, the average bank in my sample has approximately five 
shareholders, implying that banks in my sample have relatively small ownership bases.  
Table 4.5 presents the covariate balance for variables used in my analysis. After 
reweighting observations using CEM, my total sample includes 2,710 observations, 
which includes 406 treatment observations (i.e., banks whose shareholders experience a 
tax rate increase or decrease) and 2,304 control observations. I find no significant 
differences between treated and control observations across matched dimensions 
(changes in SIZE or SIZE²) and several other covariates (e.g., changes in NIM, BDSIZE, 




changes in NPL, LOANS, and TIER1).23 Overall, the results provide some evidence of 
covariate balance between treatment and control observations.  
 
Table 4.4 Bank- and County-Level Descriptive Statistics 
 
23 I do not match on variables such as changes in NPL, LOANS, and TIER1 as doing so may induce over-
control issues to the extent banks increase their risk-taking through lending activities (see Acharya et al. 
2016). In addition, including these variables as covariates when using CEM may lead to dimensionality 
problems, as it reduces the sample size for my main analyses by approximately 72 percent. However, in 
untabulated analysis, I re-estimate my tests after separately adding each variable which significantly 
differs between treatment and control observations in Table 4.5 and find similar results.  
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75 
ROAV 3,321 -6.069 0.907 -6.670 -6.132 -5.539 
ZSCORE 3,321 -3.833 0.986 -4.507 -3.907 -3.245 
SIZE 3,321 11.564 0.916 10.873 11.545 12.163 
SIZE² 3,321 134.556 21.450 118.222 133.282 147.938 
NPL 3,321 0.015 0.019 0.003 0.008 0.020 
ROA 3,321 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.012 0.017 
LOANS 3,321 0.631 0.151 0.539 0.649 0.745 
TIER1 3,321 0.100 0.028 0.083 0.093 0.110 
NIM 3,321 0.037 0.007 0.032 0.036 0.040 
LYIELD 3,321 0.050 0.011 0.042 0.050 0.058 
PERSINC 3,321 35.769 8.726 30.033 34.761 40.169 
UNEMP 3,321 0.062 0.023 0.045 0.057 0.074 
TOTPOP 3,321 194.235 733.119 15.077 29.699 88.812 
BDSIZE 3,321 4.964 2.523 3.000 5.000 6.000 
CEOCHAIR 3,321 0.764 0.425 1.000 1.000 1.000 
SHOWN 3,321 0.663 0.302 0.400 0.717 0.980 
OWNINTS 3,321 2.073 4.936 0.000 0.000 2.000 













4.4. Main Results 
As a baseline analysis of the relation between shareholder taxes and bank risk-taking, 
Table 4.6 presents the results of estimating equation (1) using shareholder tax rate increases 
calculated without regard to the shareholder’s ability to use loss offsets and tax rate decreases. 
The coefficient on INCREASE is significant for ROAV and ZSCORE (p < 0.10), suggesting that 
shareholder tax rate increases are associated with greater bank risk-taking. However, I find no 
evidence of a relation for tax rate decreases (p = 0.10), consistent with findings from prior 






 Treatment Obs. Control Obs. Diff in Means 
Variables N Mean N Mean Diff t-stat 
ΔSIZE 406 0.030 2,304 0.030 0.000 0.29 
ΔSIZE² 406 0.710 2,304 0.694 0.016 0.21 
ΔNPL 406 -0.002 2,304 0.000 -0.002*** 3.20 
ΔLOANS 406 0.002 2,304 -0.004 0.006** 2.54 
ΔTIER1 406 0.002 2,304 0.001 0.001** 2.21 
ΔNIM 406 0.000 2,304 -0.000 0000 1.62 
ΔBDSIZE 406 -0.002 2,304 -0.011 0.009 0.27 
ΔCEOCHAIR 406 0.012 2,304 -0.002 0.014 1.49 
ΔSHOWN 406 -0.014 2,304 -0.001 -0.012*** -4.55 
ΔPERSINC 406 0.035 2,304 0.043 -0.008*** -2.63 
ΔTOTPOP 406 0.003 2,304 0.002 0.000 0.76 










To test my hypotheses, I estimate equation (2) after calculating tax rate increases 
separately based on shareholders’ ability to use loss offsets. As shown in Table 4.7, the 
coefficient on INCREASE_OFFSET is positive and significant for changes in ROAV and 
ZSCORE (p < 0.10). This suggests that shareholder tax rate increases are positively associated 
with bank risk-taking for shareholders who can use loss offsets, consistent with H1a. In terms of 
 (1) (2) 
Variables ΔROAV ΔZSCORE 
INCREASE 0.020* 0.203* 
 (1.764) (1.767) 
DECREASE -0.037 -0.380 
 (-1.634) (-1.585) 
ΔSIZE -0.006 -0.055 
 (-1.593) (-1.379) 
ΔSIZE² 0.000 0.002 
 (1.583) (1.427) 
ΔNPL 0.001 0.012 
 (0.397) (0.767) 
ΔLOANS -0.000 -0.002 
 (-0.349) (-0.260) 
ΔTIER1 -0.003  
 (-0.697)  
ΔNIM 0.010 0.066 
 (1.013) (0.701) 
ΔBDSIZE -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.950) (-1.172) 
ΔCEOCHAIR 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.066) (-0.019) 
ΔSHOWN 0.000 0.001 
 (0.325) (0.389) 
ΔPERSINC -0.001* -0.009* 
 (-1.913) (-1.890) 
ΔTOTPOP -0.001 -0.005 
 (-0.533) (-0.284) 
ΔUNEMP -0.002 -0.017 
 (-0.507) (-0.390) 
   
State*Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 2,710 2,710 






economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in the tax rate for shareholders able to 
use loss offsets is associated with a 0.03 percent (0.34 percent) increase in subsequent year ROA 
volatility (Z-score), or approximately 0.55 percent (8.92 percent) of each measure’s mean, 
respectively. However, I find no evidence of a relation between bank risk-taking and 
INCREASE_NOOFFSET or DECREASE (p = 0.10). Overall, this evidence is consistent with 
shareholder tax rate increases being positively associated with bank risk-taking when 





Table 4.7 Shareholder Taxes, Bank Risk-Taking, and Loss Offsets 
 (1) (2) 
Variables ΔROAV ΔZSCORE 
INCREASE_OFFSET 0.020* 0.204* 
 (1.771) (1.775) 
INCREASE_NOOFFSET -0.050 -0.617 
 (-0.728) (-0.944) 
DECREASE -0.037 -0.380 
 (-1.634) (-1.585) 
ΔSIZE -0.006 -0.055 
 (-1.584) (-1.367) 
ΔSIZE² 0.000 0.002 
 (1.571) (1.412) 
ΔNPL 0.001 0.013 
 (0.402) (0.772) 
ΔLOANS -0.000 -0.002 
 (-0.362) (-0.276) 
ΔTIER1 -0.003  
 (-0.713)  
ΔNIM 0.011 0.070 
 (1.051) (0.742) 
ΔBDSIZE -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.983) (-1.212) 
ΔCEOCHAIR 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.056) (-0.031) 
ΔSHOWN 0.000 0.001 
 (0.332) (0.398) 
ΔPERSINC -0.001* -0.009* 
 (-1.891) (-1.865) 
ΔTOTPOP -0.001 -0.005 
 (-0.526) (-0.276) 
ΔUNEMP -0.002 -0.014 
 (-0.452) (-0.325) 
   
State*Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 2,710 2,710 








4.4.1. Parallel Trends Assumption for Main Results 
 A key assumption of difference-in-differences estimation is that treatment and control 
groups exhibit similar trends in the outcome variables of interest prior to the treatment (Roberts 
and Whited 2013). To examine the validity of the parallel trends assumption for my main results, 
I re-estimate equation (2) after including lagged tax rate increase and decrease variables.24 To the 
extent that treatment and control firms follow similar trends prior to shareholders’ tax rate 
changes, I expect the coefficient on the tax rate change variables at t-1 to be not statistically 
different from zero (Ljungqvist et al. 2017). Figures 4.3 through 4.5 plot the regression 
coefficients and 90 percent confidence intervals and Table 4.8 presents the results. The 
coefficients on INCREASE_OFFSET, INCREASE_NOOFFSET, and DECREASE at year t-1 are 
insignificant for changes in ROAV and ZSCORE (p = 0.19), which is inconsistent with the notion 
that treatment banks anticipate their shareholders’ tax rate changes.  
 I also test for reversals and delays in risk-taking responses by including tax rate changes 
at year t+1. The coefficient on INCREASE_OFFSET at t+1 is negative and significant for 
changes in ROAV and ZSCORE (p < 0.10), consistent with a reversal of the initial increase in 
bank risk-taking for shareholders who can share in risk with the government. Although the 
coefficient on INCREASE_NOOFFSET is insignificant at year t for changes in ROAV and 
ZSCORE, it is negative and significant at year t+1 (p < 0.10). This implies that there is a one-
year delay in the risk-taking response for tax rate increases for shareholders who cannot offset 
losses, potentially because these shareholders’ lack of a formal role within the bank may make it 
 
24 To maximize the sample size for these tests, I set the shareholder’s state and status as the bank’s dominant 
shareholder is equal to that for year t and separately calculate each shareholder’s state tax rate increase at t-1 and 
t+1. Given that ownership and shareholders’ states of residence are relatively stable from year to year for the banks 




difficult to immediately affect the organization’s risk-taking decisions. Consistent with my main 
results, I find no evidence of a significant association between tax rate decreases for year t+1 or 
year t and either risk-taking measure (p = 0.14). Overall, the evidence suggests that treatment and 
control groups exhibit similar trends in ROAV and ZSCORE before treatment, consistent with the 











































Table 4.8 Anticipation and Reversal Effects of Shareholder Taxes on Bank Risk-Taking 
 (1) (2) 
Variables ΔROAV ΔZSCORE 
INCREASE_OFFSET (t-1) -0.012 -0.125 
 (-1.302) (-1.325) 
INCREASE_OFFSET (t) 0.021* 0.208* 
 (1.782) (1.789) 
INCREASE_OFFSET (t+1) -0.021* -0.233** 
 (-1.879) (-2.033) 
INCREASE_NOOFFSET (t-1) 0.007 0.075 
 (0.263) (0.285) 
INCREASE_NOOFFSET (t) -0.051 -0.622 
 (-0.725) (-0.938) 
INCREASE_NOOFFSET (t+1) -0.017* -0.207** 
 (-1.871) (-2.190) 
DECREASE (t-1) 0.007 0.091 
 (0.435) (0.599) 
DECREASE (t) -0.030 -0.296 
 (-1.524) (-1.450) 
DECREASE (t+1) -0.011 -0.134 
 (-0.812) (-0.898) 
ΔSIZE -0.006 -0.048 
 (-1.397) (-1.191) 
ΔSIZE² 0.000 0.002 
 (1.370) (1.212) 
ΔNPL 0.001 0.012 
 (0.391) (0.761) 
ΔLOANS -0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.298) (-0.202) 
ΔTIER1 -0.002  
 (-0.477)  
ΔNIM 0.010 0.067 
 (0.952) (0.703) 
ΔBDSIZE -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.925) (-1.153) 
ΔCEOCHAIR 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.054) (-0.026) 
ΔSHOWN 0.000 0.001 
 (0.380) (0.434) 
ΔPERSINC -0.001* -0.009* 
 (-1.880) (-1.848) 
ΔTOTPOP -0.001 -0.007 
 (-0.678) (-0.405) 
ΔUNEMP -0.001 -0.009 
 (-0.333) (-0.216) 
   
State*Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 2,710 2,710 





4.4.2. Shareholder Taxes and Bank Risk-Taking by Shareholder Role 
While the results above suggest a positive relation between shareholders’ personal tax 
rates and bank risk-taking for shareholders able to use loss offsets, I next examine whether this 
relation depends on shareholders’ specific roles within the bank. For example, to the extent that 
the bank’s dominant shareholder also serves as the CEO, the shareholder can use both their 
voting power and control of the bank’s operational decisions to align the bank’s risk-taking 
decisions with their personal tax incentives. Consistent with this, evidence in Armstrong et al. 
(2019) suggests that increases in CEOs’ personal taxes—but not those of middle managers—are 
associated with greater firm risk-taking. In contrast, although non-CEO shareholders generally 
do not manage the bank’s operational decisions, they may use their large blocks of voting power 
to influence the bank’s risk-taking decisions (Shleifer and Vishny 1997), regardless of their 
formal role within the bank.  
To test this possibility, I separate INCREASE_OFFSET into tax rate increases for 
dominant shareholders who also serve as the bank’s CEO (INCREASE_OFFSET_CEO) and all 
other non-CEO dominant shareholders (INCREASE_OFFSET_NONCEO) and estimate the 
following equation:  
ΔRISKit+1 = β0 + β1INCREASE_OFFSET_CEOit + β2INCREASE_OFFSET_NONCEOit + 
β3INCREASE_NOOFFSETit + β4DECREASEit + βkΔCONTROLSit + 




To the extent that CEOs’ and non-CEOs’ personal taxes affect bank risk-taking, I expect a 
positive relation between INCREASE_OFFSET_CEO and INCREASE_OFFSET_NONCEO and 
changes in ROAV and ZSCORE.25  
Table 4.9 presents the results. The coefficient on INCREASE_OFFSET_CEO is positive 
and significant for changes in both ROAV and ZSCORE (p < 0.10), consistent with evidence in 
Armstrong et al. (2019) that CEOs’ personal taxes are positively associated with firm risk-taking. 
In contrast, the coefficient on INCREASE_OFFSET_NONCEO is insignificant (p = 0.16), 
potentially because management of the operational decisions outweighs ownership power for the 
banks in my sample. However, the difference in coefficients is not statistically significant (p = 
0.85).26 Collectively, these results suggest that the positive relation between shareholder tax rate 
increases and bank risk-taking is concentrated in bank-years where the dominant shareholder is 




25 For simplicity, INCREASE_OFFSET_NONCEO includes tax increases for any non-CEO dominant shareholder 
who is able to use loss offsets, including other executives and employees and shareholders with a limited or no 
formal role in the bank (but who have the ability to offset losses due to other passive income). However, in 
untabulated analysis, I re-estimate equation (3) after further separating INCREASE_OFFSET_NONCEO into tax rate 
increases for other executives and bank employees and shareholders with a limited or no formal role in the bank. I 
continue to find a positive and significant relation between changes in CEOs’ personal tax rate increases and 
changes in ROAV and ZSCORE, but no evidence of a relation for shareholders who are other executives and 
employees of the bank or for shareholders with a limited or no formal role in the bank.  
26 Given that ownership structure is endogenous, it is possible that banks where the dominant shareholder is also the 
CEO are inherently different from banks where the dominant shareholder holds a non-CEO role. To test this 




Table 4.9 Shareholder Taxes and Bank Risk-Taking by Shareholder Role 
 (1) (2) 
Variables ΔROAV ΔZSCORE 
INCREASE_OFFSET_CEO 0.021* 0.211* 
 (1.757) (1.774) 
INCREASE_OFFSET_NONCEO 0.019 0.190 
 (1.403) (1.388) 
INCREASE_NOOFFSET -0.050 -0.613 
 (-0.723) (-0.938) 
DECREASE -0.037 -0.380 
 (-1.632) (-1.582) 
ΔSIZE -0.006 -0.055 
 (-1.581) (-1.364) 
ΔSIZE² 0.000 0.002 
 (1.568) (1.410) 
ΔNPL 0.001 0.013 
 (0.405) (0.775) 
ΔLOANS -0.000 -0.002 
 (-0.361) (-0.275) 
ΔTIER1 -0.003  
 (-0.715)  
ΔNIM 0.011 0.070 
 (1.051) (0.742) 
ΔBDSIZE -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.987) (-1.216) 
ΔCEOCHAIR 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.048) (-0.039) 
ΔSHOWN 0.000 0.001 
 (0.326) (0.391) 
ΔPERSINC -0.001* -0.009* 
 (-1.889) (-1.863) 
ΔTOTPOP -0.001 -0.005 
 (-0.528) (-0.278) 
ΔUNEMP -0.002 -0.014 
 (-0.451) (-0.324) 
   
State*Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 2,710 2,710 





4.5. Cross-Sectional Analysis 
Prior research suggests that certain bank-level and investor-level characteristics can affect 
bank risk-taking and firm sensitivity to shareholder tax rate changes, respectively (Allen et al. 
2011; Barton et al. 2014; Faccio et al. 2011; Jacob and Michaely 2017; Thakor 2012). Thus, in 
this section, I explore whether the relation between shareholder tax rate increases and bank risk-
taking varies with bank capital, external monitoring by auditors, and shareholder conflicts and 
diversification. 
 
4.5.1. Bank Capital 
Bank capital plays an important role in determining banks’ risk-taking appetite (Matten 
2000). For instance, theory proposes that by increasing banks’ incentives to monitor borrowers 
or decreasing the appeal of risky, innovative products that may increase the likelihood of 
financial crisis, greater bank capital leads to lower bank risk (Allen et al. 2011; Thakor 2012). 
Consistent with this view, Berger and Udell (1994) find evidence of a negative association 
between higher capital requirements and bank lending. Similarly, banks’ risk-taking response to 
changes in their shareholders’ personal tax rates may vary based on capital.27 To the extent 
higher bank capital leads to less bank risk, I expect that lower (higher) capitalized banks increase 
(decrease) their risk-taking in response to increases in their shareholders’ taxes when 
shareholders can (cannot) share in risk with the government through loss offsets, respectively. To 
test this possibility, I create an indicator variable, HICAP, which equals one for bank-years 
where Tier 1 capital is in the highest tercile of the distribution in a given year, and zero 
 
27 While other research suggests that greater bank capital encourages risk-taking (e.g., Koehn and Santomero 1980), 




otherwise. I re-estimate equation (2) in each subsample after separately using CEM in each 
sample, excluding TIER1 from the ROAV regressions due to the design.28  
Table 4.10 presents the results. After reweighting observations using CEM, my total 
sample includes 2,399 observations, which includes 141 treatment observations and 737 control 
observations in the high capitalization subsample and 252 treatment observations and 1,269 
control observations in the low capitalization subsample (untabulated). Beginning with banks in 
which HICAP = 0, the coefficient on INCREASE_OFFSET is positive and significant for 
changes in both ROAV and ZSCORE (p < 0.10), but insignificant for INCREASE_NOOFFSET (p 
= 0.13). This implies that increases in shareholder tax rates are positively associated with bank 
risk-taking in less-capitalized banks where shareholders can share in risk with the government, 
but not for shareholders without a similar risk-sharing ability.  
In contrast, for banks with high levels of capital (HICAP = 1), the coefficient on 
INCREASE_OFFSET is insignificant for ROAV and ZSCORE (p = 0.35), while the coefficient on 
INCREASE_NOOFFSET is negative and significant for both measures (p < 0.05). Thus, while 
highly capitalized banks appear to decrease their risk-taking in response to tax rate increases for 
shareholders who cannot use loss offsets, I find no evidence of a relation for shareholders who 
can share in risk with the government. Differences in coefficients between subsamples are 
significant for INCREASE_NOOFFSET (p < 0.05), but insignificant for INCREASE_OFFSET (p 
= 0.26). Overall, the evidence suggests that increases (decreases) in bank risk-taking in response 
 
28 I use Tier 1 capital to partition the sample because of the difficulty of incorporating changes in capital 
requirements into my research design with changes in state tax rates. However, a potential concern is that Tier 1 
capital is a component of Z-score, which may induce a mechanical correlation in this test. In untabulated analysis, I 
find that the correlation between changes in ZSCORE and HICAP is approximately 1 percent and statistically 
insignificant (p = 0.51), suggesting that HICAP is likely not inducing a mechanical association between shareholder 




to shareholder tax rate increases are concentrated in banks with low (high) levels of capital, 
respectively, consistent with the view that bank risk-taking decreases as capital increases (Allen 










 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 HICAP = 0 HICAP = 1 Tests of Differences 
Variables ΔROAV  ΔZSCORE ΔROAV ΔZSCORE (1) vs (3) (2) vs (4) 
INCREASE_OFFSET 0.023* 0.243* 0.029 0.255 -0.006 -0.012 
 (1.658) (1.776) (0.938) (0.829) (1.300) (0.980) 
INCREASE_NOOFFSET 0.196 1.176 -0.171** -1.838** 0.367** 3.014** 
 (1.512) (0.913) (-2.011) (-2.222) (6.250) (5.153) 
DECREASE -0.141** -1.459** -0.046*** -0.450***   
 (-2.107) (-2.110) (-3.145) (-2.943)   
ΔSIZE 0.003 0.048 -0.011 -0.107   
 (0.545) (0.840) (-1.140) (-1.060)   
ΔSIZE² -0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.004   
 (-0.535) (-0.706) (1.085) (1.039)   
ΔNPL 0.004 0.049* 0.001 0.018   
 (1.411) (1.774) (0.460) (0.579)   
ΔLOANS -0.001 -0.014 -0.001 -0.006   
 (-1.534) (-1.450) (-0.519) (-0.599)   
ΔTIER1 -0.016**  -0.004    
 (-2.161)  (-0.628)    
ΔNIM 0.026* 0.150 -0.002 -0.088   
 (1.688) (1.039) (-0.122) (-0.473)   
ΔBDSIZE 0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.002**   
 (0.107) (-0.076) (-2.586) (-2.559)   
ΔCEOCHAIR 0.000 0.002 -0.001** -0.007**   
 (1.573) (1.346) (-2.197) (-2.108)   
ΔSHOWN 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.004   
 (0.358) (0.243) (0.969) (1.142)   
ΔPERSINC -0.001** -0.012** 0.001 0.012   
 (-2.061) (-1.991) (1.035) (1.165)   
ΔTOTPOP -0.002 -0.015 0.005 0.056   
 (-0.817) (-0.536) (1.434) (1.406)   
ΔUNEMP 0.005 0.063 -0.007 -0.064   
 (0.632) (0.881) (-0.840) (-0.782)   
       
State*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Observations 1,521 1,521 878 878   




4.5.2. External Auditor Monitoring 
Monitoring by external financial statement auditors may also affect banks’ sensitivity to 
changes in their shareholders’ personal tax rates, as independent audits serve as a bonding 
mechanism to protect the interests of minority shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). For 
instance, Barton et al. (2014) find that voluntary financial statement audits are associated with 
lower rates of bank failure in a sample of privately-held commercial banks, which they attribute 
to the monitoring value of external auditors constraining managers’ ability to change the bank’s 
risk-taking decisions. Similarly, banks with external audits may have less leeway with which to 
alter the bank’s risk-taking decisions in response to their shareholders’ tax rate changes. Thus, to 
the extent that external auditors serve as form of monitoring of bank risk-taking, I expect banks 
without external audits to be more responsive to increases in their shareholders’ personal taxes, 
relative to banks with voluntary financial statement audits. To test this possibility, I follow 
Barton et al. (2014) and Nicoletti (2018) and set an indicator variable, EXTAUDIT, equal to one 
if the bank has its financial statements verified by an external auditor, and zero otherwise. The 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) requires an 
independent financial audit of banks with assets less than $500 million.29 Thus, to capture 
variation in audit status, I limit my sample to banks with assets less than $500 million and re-
estimate equation (2) for each subsample of EXTAUDIT after using CEM to balance each 
subsample. 
Table 4.11 presents the results. After reweighting observations using CEM, my total 
sample includes 2,403 observations, which includes 63 treatment observations and 441 control 
 




observations in the external audit subsample and 298 treatment observations and 1,601 control 
observations in the subsample without an external audit (untabulated). With respect to banks 
where EXTAUDIT = 0, the coefficient on INCREASE_OFFSET (INCREASE_NOOFFSET) is 
positive and significant (negative and significant) for changes in ROAV and ZSCORE (p < 0.01), 
respectively. This implies that in banks with less external monitoring, increases in shareholder 
tax rates are positively (negatively) associated with risk-taking to the extent shareholders can 
(cannot) use loss offsets, respectively. In contrast, I find a negative relation between 
INCREASE_OFFSET and both risk measures for audited banks (EXTAUDIT = 1) (p <0.01), 
potentially due to auditor monitoring reducing incentives to take on greater risk (Barton et al. 
2014) or because banks which choose external audits may be less risky in general (e.g., Lennox 
and Pittman 2011). I also find no evidence of a significant association for 
INCREASE_NOOFFSET (p = 0.52) in banks where EXTAUDIT = 1. Differences between 
subsamples are statistically significant (p < 0.01). Overall, increases in shareholder taxes 
increase (decrease) risk-taking in banks whose shareholders can (cannot) share in losses with the 
government, but greater monitoring from external auditors appears to mitigate or even reverse 






Table 4.11 Shareholder Taxes, Bank Risk-Taking, and External Monitoring by Auditors 
 
 
4.5.3. Shareholder Conflicts 
Jacob and Michaely (2017) argue that the complexity of choosing the optimal outcome 
for all shareholders increases with the size of a firm’s shareholder base. This, in turn, may 
impose greater coordination costs on the firm and reduce the firm’s sensitivity to changes in 
shareholder taxes. Consistent with this view, Jacob and Michaely (2017) find firms’ dividend 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 EXTAUDIT = 0 EXTAUDIT = 1 Tests of Differences 
Variables ΔROAV  ΔZSCORE ΔROAV ΔZSCORE (1) vs (3) (2) vs (4) 
INCREASE_OFFSET 0.036*** 0.368*** -0.038*** -0.397*** 0.074*** 0.765*** 
 (3.347) (3.586) (-3.274) (-3.532) (4.244) (6.656) 
INCREASE_NOOFFSET -0.130*** -1.356*** 0.030 -0.102 -0.160*** -1.254*** 
 (-2.771) (-2.975) (0.648) (-0.229) (14.900) (12.816) 
DECREASE -0.062* -0.642* 0.107 1.252   
 (-1.923) (-1.876) (1.024) (1.190)   
ΔSIZE 0.002 0.029 -0.034* -0.332   
 (0.296) (0.431) (-1.870) (-1.653)   
ΔSIZE² -0.000 -0.001 0.001* 0.015*   
 (-0.362) (-0.472) (1.855) (1.723)   
ΔNPL 0.005** 0.059*** -0.001 -0.011   
 (2.553) (2.824) (-0.285) (-0.288)   
ΔLOANS 0.000 0.002 -0.002* -0.023   
 (0.189) (0.313) (-1.657) (-1.593)   
ΔTIER1 0.000  -0.013    
 (0.087)  (-1.284)    
ΔNIM 0.006 0.036 0.027 0.218   
 (0.485) (0.331) (1.175) (0.951)   
ΔBDSIZE -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001   
 (-0.947) (-1.094) (-0.723) (-0.658)   
ΔCEOCHAIR -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.004   
 (-0.182) (-0.343) (-1.180) (-1.022)   
ΔSHOWN 0.001* 0.010* 0.002 0.022   
 (1.786) (1.788) (0.935) (1.024)   
ΔPERSINC -0.001 -0.005 -0.003** -0.024*   
 (-0.866) (-0.796) (-1.990) (-1.890)   
ΔTOTPOP -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.045   
 (-0.412) (-0.165) (-1.074) (-1.183)   
ΔUNEMP 0.002 0.022 -0.011 -0.094   
 (0.409) (0.394) (-1.357) (-1.171)   
       
State*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Observations 1,899 1,899 504 504   




payout responses to a reduction in shareholder dividend taxes in Sweden decreases as the firm’s 
number of shareholders increases. Similarly, for banks with diverse ownership bases, differences 
in shareholders’ risk preferences (e.g., risk aversion) and tax rates may increase the difficulty of 
selecting the level of risk-taking that optimizes benefits for all shareholders. To the extent that 
shareholder conflicts mitigate banks’ response to shareholder taxes, I expect banks with smaller 
shareholder bases to be more responsive to changes in their shareholders’ personal taxes.  
I test this by creating an indicator variable, CONFLICT, which is set equal to one if the 
bank’s number of shareholders is in the highest tercile of the distribution, and zero otherwise.30 I 
then estimate equation (2) in both subsamples after using CEM to separately balance each 
subsample. Table 4.12 presents the results. After reweighting observations using CEM, my total 
sample includes 2,510 observations, which includes 112 treatment observations and 564 control 
observations in the high shareholder conflict subsample and 278 treatment observations and 
1,556 control observations in the low shareholder conflict subsample (untabulated). Beginning 
with banks with relatively few shareholder conflicts (CONFLICT = 0), the coefficient on 
INCREASE_OFFSET (INCREASE_NOOFFSET) is positive and significant (negative and 
significant) for changes in ROAV and ZSCORE (p < 0.05), respectively. This implies that banks 
with relatively few conflicts of interest among shareholders increase (decrease) their risk-taking 
in response to tax rate increases for shareholders who can (cannot) use loss offsets.  
In contrast, for banks where CONFLICT = 1, the coefficients on INCREASE_OFFSET 
and INCREASE_NOOFFSET are insignificant for both risk measures (p = 0.63). Differences in 
coefficients between subsets are statistically significant for INCREASE_OFFSET (p < 0.10), but 
 
30 Jacob and Michaely (2017) show that firms’ dividend response begins to weaken for firms with four or more 
shareholders. Because banks in the highest tercile of my sample have at least four five percent or greater 




insignificant for INCREASE_OFFSET (p = 0.27). In addition, I find no evidence that shareholder 
conflicts affect the relation between shareholder tax rate decreases and bank risk-taking, as the 
coefficient on DECREASE is insignificant for both subsamples (p = 0.13). Thus, while increases 
in shareholders’ tax rates increase (decrease) bank risk-taking when shareholders can (cannot) 
share in losses with the government, coordination issues among a bank’s shareholder base appear 




31 In untabulated analysis, I re-estimate these tests after forming tercile partitions using only shareholders that own at 




Table 4.12 Shareholder Taxes, Bank Risk-Taking, and Shareholder Conflicts 
 
 
4.5.4. Shareholder Diversification 
Faccio et al. (2011) argue that risk-averse, poorly diversified shareholders may direct 
their firms to decrease risk-taking while shareholders with diversified portfolios may be more 
risk tolerant to the extent they can diversify away any increased firm-specific risk. Consistent 
with this, Faccio et al. (2011) find that dominant shareholders increase their firms’ risk-taking 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CONFLICT = 0 CONFLICT = 1 Tests of Differences 
Variables ΔROAV  ΔZSCORE ΔROAV ΔZSCORE (1) vs (3) (2) vs (4) 
INCREASE_OFFSET 0.029*** 0.285*** -0.007 -0.070 0.036** 0.355* 
 (2.833) (2.805) (-0.330) (-0.341) (4.203) (3.610) 
INCREASE_NOOFFSET -0.093** -0.943** -0.014 -0.323 -0.079 -0.620 
 (-2.056) (-2.179) (-0.238) (-0.489) (1.464) (0.922) 
DECREASE -0.048 -0.543 -0.095 -0.904   
 (-1.018) (-1.060) (-1.515) (-1.407)   
ΔSIZE 0.008 0.083 -0.008 -0.055   
 (1.313) (1.359) (-0.851) (-0.586)   
ΔSIZE² -0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.003   
 (-1.306) (-1.283) (0.938) (0.700)   
ΔNPL 0.000 0.007 -0.001 -0.001   
 (0.080) (0.353) (-0.193) (-0.018)   
ΔLOANS -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.012   
 (-0.003) (0.094) (0.753) (0.833)   
ΔTIER1 -0.008  -0.004    
 (-1.521)  (-0.431)    
ΔNIM 0.027** 0.183* -0.041* -0.468*   
 (2.295) (1.677) (-1.660) (-1.919)   
ΔBDSIZE -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 -0.000   
 (-1.584) (-1.813) (-0.349) (-0.414)   
ΔCEOCHAIR 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000   
 (0.473) (0.377) (-0.076) (-0.060)   
ΔSHOWN 0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.017   
 (0.272) (0.483) (-1.502) (-1.511)   
ΔPERSINC -0.001** -0.012** -0.001 -0.006   
 (-2.159) (-2.178) (-0.607) (-0.597)   
ΔTOTPOP 0.002 0.027 -0.001 -0.012   
 (0.813) (1.038) (-0.347) (-0.418)   
ΔUNEMP -0.005 -0.047 -0.002 -0.017   
 (-0.952) (-0.934) (-0.273) (-0.214)   
       
State*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Observations 1,957 1,957 610 610   




relative to undiversified, dominant shareholders. Similarly, shareholder portfolio diversification 
may increase banks’ sensitivity to changes in their shareholders’ personal tax rate changes 
because these shareholders may be less affected by firm-specific risk. However, given that 
greater diversification makes individuals less risk-averse (Parrino et al. 2005), banks whose 
shareholders hold diversified portfolios outside of the bank may exhibit less risk-aversion and 
consequently, may be less sensitive to increases in shareholder taxes, relative to banks whose 
shareholders are undiversified. To investigate the effect of shareholder diversification on the 
relation between shareholder tax rate changes and bank risk-taking, I create an indicator variable, 
DIV, which equals one if the dominant shareholder’s number of outside ownership interests is in 
the highest tercile of the distribution, and zero otherwise. I then estimate equation (2) in both 
subsamples after using CEM in each sample.  
After reweighting observations with CEM, my total sample includes 2,501 observations, 
which includes 95 treatment observations and 486 control observations in the diversified 
subsample and 291 treatment observations and 1,629 control observations in the undiversified 
(untabulated). As shown in Table 4.13, I find no evidence of a relation between 
INCREASE_OFFSET or INCREASE_NOOFFSET and bank risk-taking for either subset of banks 
(p = 0.26). In contrast, the coefficient on DECREASE is negative and significant (positive and 
significant) for ROAV and ZSCORE in banks where DIV = 0 (DIV = 1), respectively (p < 0.10). 
This suggests that shareholder tax rate decreases are associated with less (greater) bank risk-
taking when shareholders hold undiversified (more diversified) portfolios, respectively. Overall, 
I find little evidence that shareholder portfolio diversification affects the relation between 
shareholder tax rate increases and bank risk-taking. However, the evidence suggests that tax rate 




the ability to diversify any increased risk appears to reverse this response.  
 




Combining Tables 4.3 through 4.13, I find that increases in dominant shareholders’ state 
income taxes are positively associated with bank risk-taking when shareholders can share in risk 
with the government via loss offsets. This relation is concentrated in less-capitalized banks, as 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 DIV = 0 DIV = 1 Tests of Differences 
Variables ΔROAV  ΔZSCORE ΔROAV ΔZSCORE (1) vs (3) (2) vs (4) 
INCREASE_OFFSET 0.005 0.039 0.024 0.247 -0.019 -0.208 
 (0.290) (0.240) (0.903) (0.992) (0.314) (0.423) 
INCREASE_NOOFFSET 0.162 1.120 -0.052 -0.589 0.214 1.709 
 (1.125) (0.776) (-0.633) (-0.762) (1.538) (0.980) 
DECREASE -0.059* -0.600* 0.067** 0.681**   
 (-1.704) (-1.665) (2.071) (2.160)   
ΔSIZE -0.009 -0.087 0.001 0.008   
 (-1.599) (-1.521) (0.071) (0.060)   
ΔSIZE² 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000   
 (1.539) (1.492) (0.042) (0.057)   
ΔNPL 0.004** 0.041** 0.004 0.053   
 (2.135) (2.264) (0.965) (1.175)   
ΔLOANS 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003   
 (0.049) (0.142) (0.222) (0.173)   
ΔTIER1 -0.002  0.001    
 (-0.396)  (0.069)    
ΔNIM 0.007 0.040 0.028 0.282   
 (0.558) (0.331) (1.153) (1.186)   
ΔBDSIZE -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.002*   
 (-0.410) (-0.548) (-1.754) (-1.690)   
ΔCEOCHAIR -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.004   
 (-0.072) (-0.191) (1.328) (1.485)   
ΔSHOWN -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.014   
 (-0.427) (-0.340) (0.835) (0.889)   
ΔPERSINC -0.001 -0.007 -0.002 -0.016   
 (-1.190) (-1.153) (-1.295) (-1.230)   
ΔTOTPOP 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.011   
 (0.347) (0.403) (0.100) (0.208)   
ΔUNEMP -0.005 -0.048 0.004 0.036   
 (-0.941) (-0.885) (0.436) (0.373)   
       
State*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Observations 1,920 1,920 581 581   




well as those where the dominant shareholder is the bank’s CEO, external monitoring is lower, 
and there are relatively few conflicts among shareholders. In contrast, I find a negative relation 
between shareholder tax rate increases and bank risk-taking for banks with higher levels of 




5. OTHER ANALYSIS 
 
5.1. Alternative Risk Measures 
 Although my primary tests focus on ROA volatility and Z-score as measures of bank risk, 
I also examine other risk-taking measures used in prior literature: non-performing loans (NPL), 
net charge-offs (NCO), and risk-weighted assets (RWA) (e.g., Bouwman and Malmendier 2015; 
Cantrell and Yust 2018; Kanagaretnam et al. 2014). I then re-estimate equation (2) using NPL, 
NCO, and RWA as the dependent variable and including ROA to control for bank performance.  
 Table 5.1 presents the results. The coefficient on INCREASE_OFFSET is positive and 
significant for changes in RWA (p < 0.05), but insignificant for NPL and NCO (p = 0.12). With 
respect to risk-weighted assets, this suggests that increases in shareholder tax rates are positively 
associated with risk-weighted assets when shareholders can use loss offsets, consistent with my 
primary findings. The coefficient on INCREASE_NOOFFSET is negative and significant for 
changes in NPL (p < 0.05), consistent with theory that personal tax rate increases for 
shareholders unable to share in risk with the government are associated with less risk-taking 
(Domar and Musgrave 1944). In contrast, the coefficient on INCREASE_NOOFFSET is positive 
and significant for RWA (p < 0.01) and insignificant for NCO (p = 0.67), suggesting that the bank 
risk-taking response for these shareholders’ tax rate increases may not be consistent across 
different measures of risk-taking. The positive coefficient on DECREASE for changes in RWA (p 
< 0.05) but insignificant relations for NPL and NCO (p = 0.226) suggest a similar mixed effect of 
shareholder tax rate decreases on bank risk-taking. Overall, the results provide some, albeit 
mixed, support for my main findings that shareholder tax rate increases are positively associated 




Table 5.1 Other Risk-Taking Measures 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables ΔNPL ΔNCO ΔRWA 
INCREASE_OFFSET 0.245 0.054 1.109** 
 (1.552) (0.975) (2.389) 
INCREASE_NOOFFSET -1.708*** 0.089 6.786*** 
 (-3.287) (0.428) (4.188) 
DECREASE -0.402 -0.091 1.919** 
 (-1.213) (-0.947) (2.246) 
ΔSIZE -0.069 -0.025 -0.099 
 (-1.174) (-0.917) (-0.473) 
ΔSIZE² 0.003 0.002 0.007 
 (1.386) (1.521) (0.745) 
ΔNPL  0.112*** -0.143 
  (5.820) (-1.431) 
ΔROA -0.142* 0.160*** 0.120 
 (-1.688) (2.633) (0.488) 
ΔLOANS 0.020** 0.023*** -0.033 
 (1.997) (5.563) (-1.139) 
ΔTIER1 -0.035 0.012 -0.057 
 (-0.479) (0.436) (-0.265) 
ΔNIM 0.114 -0.062 0.411 
 (0.627) (-0.860) (0.737) 
ΔBDSIZE -0.000 -0.000 0.004* 
 (-0.280) (-0.262) (1.782) 
ΔCEOCHAIR 0.000 -0.003*** -0.004 
 (0.199) (-2.908) (-0.311) 
ΔSHOWN -0.008* -0.002 -0.002 
 (-1.788) (-1.106) (-0.143) 
ΔPERSINC 0.011* -0.002 -0.022 
 (1.730) (-0.756) (-0.857) 
ΔTOTPOP 0.011 -0.009 -0.063 
 (0.350) (-0.701) (-0.475) 
ΔUNEMP 0.041 0.018 0.189 
 (0.517) (0.606) (0.900) 
    
State*Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,710 2,710 2,710 






5.2. Tax Rate Decreases and Loss Offsets 
 I focus on the effect of tax rate increases on bank risk-taking in my primary analysis 
because prior research generally finds little evidence that tax rate decreases affect corporate risk-
taking (e.g., Ljungqvist et al. 2017; Blouin et al. 2020). However, it is possible that tax rate 
decreases may also differentially affect bank risk-taking depending on shareholders’ ability to 
use loss offsets. For example, although tax rate decreases would benefit all investors by 
increasing their after-tax returns, shareholders without the ability to offset losses would have less 
ability to offset the cost of risk-taking relative to shareholders able to use loss offsets. Thus, 
decreases in shareholder tax rates may lead to a greater decrease in risk-taking for shareholders 
who are unable to use loss offsets.  
To test this possibility, I repeat my main analyses after separating DECREASE into 1) 
DECREASE_OFFSET and DECREASE_NOOFFSET and 2) DECREASE_OFFSET_CEO, 
DECREASE_OFFSET_NONCEO, and DECREASE_NOOFFSET, respectively. Tables 5.2 and 
5.3 present the results, with coefficients on control variables omitted for brevity. As shown in 
Table 5.2, I continue to find a positive and significant coefficient on INCREASE_OFFSET for 
both ROAV and ZSCORE (p < 0.10) and no evidence of an effect for tax rate decreases (p = 
0.10). Similarly, in Table 5.3, I continue to find a positive and significant coefficient on 
INCREASE_OFFSET_CEO for both ROAV and ZSCORE (p < 0.10) and limited evidence that 
tax rate decreases affect bank risk-taking, although the coefficient on 
DECREASE_OFFSET_NONCEO is negative and significant (p < 0.10). Collectively, this 
evidence is consistent with tax rate decreases having a limited effect on bank risk-taking, 


































5.3. Falsification Tests 
Although the results in Section 4.4.1 are consistent with the validity of the parallel trends 
 (1) (2) 
Variables ΔROAV ΔZSCORE 
INCREASE_OFFSET 0.020* 0.204* 
 (1.771) (1.775) 
INCREASE_NOOFFSET -0.050 -0.616 
 (-0.727) (-0.943) 
DECREASE_OFFSET -0.037 -0.380 
 (-1.634) (-1.584) 
DECREASE_NOOFFSET -0.024 -0.242 
 (-1.007) (-0.951) 
   
Controls Yes Yes 
State*Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 2,710 2,710 
Adjusted R²  0.094 0.101 
 (1) (2) 
Variables ΔROAV ΔZSCORE 
INCREASE_OFFSET_CEO 0.021* 0.213* 
 (1.763) (1.779) 
INCREASE_OFFSET_NONCEO 0.019 0.192 
 (1.409) (1.394) 
INCREASE_NOOFFSET -0.050 -0.612 
 (-0.720) (-0.935) 
DECREASE_OFFSET_CEO -0.029 -0.304 
 (-1.126) (-1.137) 
DECREASE_OFFSET_NONCEO -0.041* -0.412* 
 (-1.783) (-1.716) 
DECREASE_NOOFFSET -0.018 -0.187 
 (-0.707) (-0.694) 
   
Controls Yes Yes 
State*Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 2,710 2,710 




assumption, I also conduct falsification tests to provide further evidence that my results are 
attributable to changes in shareholder tax rates and not an unknown prior event (Roberts and 
Whited 2013). Specifically, following Kubick et al. (2016), I re-estimate equations (1) through 
(3) after replacing actual event years (i.e., bank-years in which the bank’s dominant shareholder 
experiences a change in his state tax rate) with pseudo-events that are deemed to occur one year 
before the shareholders’ actual tax rate change. To the extent that increases in shareholders’ 
personal taxes prompt increases in bank risk, I expect the coefficient on each tax increase 
variable to be statistically insignificant (Roberts and Whited 2013). Tables 5.4 and 5.5 present 
the results, with coefficients on control variables omitted for brevity. Consistent with my 
expectations, I find insignificant coefficients on INCREASE, INCREASE_OFFSET, and 
INCREASE_OFFSET_CEO for both ROAV and NPL (p > 0.21). This is consistent with the effect 
of increases in shareholder taxes on bank risk-taking occurring in the year of the tax rate change 
rather than in past periods.  
 









 (1) (2) 
Variables ΔROAV ΔZSCORE 
INCREASE 0.017 0.156 
 (1.250) (1.172) 
DECREASE -0.059* -0.607* 
 (-1.964) (-1.942) 
   
Controls Yes Yes 
State*Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 2,207 2,207 













5.4. Validity of Other Assumptions 
 In this section, I revisit the validity of two key assumptions in my tests: shareholder risk 
aversion and the loss offset mechanism. Although difficulties in measuring risk aversion make it 
challenging to conclusively show that shareholders in my sample are risk-averse, this assumption 
is likely descriptive of my sample for two reasons. First, Fama and Jensen (1983) posit that 
shareholder-managers tend to be risk-averse when both corporate decision-making and equity 
ownership are concentrated in a small number of shareholders because these individuals are less 
diversified relative to organizations with more diffuse ownership structures. Because my sample 
is largely composed of small, privately-held banks with relatively little separation of ownership 
from control, shareholders in my sample are more likely to be risk-averse, on average. Second, 
given that the vast majority of shareholders in my sample hold relatively undiversified portfolios, 
this similarly suggests that individuals are likely more risk-averse, on average.  
 To further validate this assumption, in untabulated analysis, I re-estimate my main tests 
after excluding highly diversified shareholders from my sample, as these shareholders are 
 (1) (2) 
Variables ΔROAV ΔZSCORE 
INCREASE_OFFSET 0.017 0.157 
 (1.255) (1.178) 
INCREASE_NOOFFSET -0.049 -0.612 
 (-0.685) (-0.889) 
DECREASE -0.059* -0.606* 
 (-1.964) (-1.941) 
   
Controls Yes Yes 
State*Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 2,207 2,207 




generally risk neutral because they can diversify their shareholdings across many firms (Coffee 
1986).32 Similar to my main results, I find that increases in state tax rates for shareholders who 
can use loss offsets—and particularly those who are the bank’s CEO—are associated with higher 
ROA volatility and Z-score. However, I also find evidence that increases in state tax rates for 
shareholders unable to use loss offsets are associated with decreased ROA volatility and Z-score. 
Collectively, the evidence is consistent with results likely being driven by risk-averse 
shareholders. 
 In addition, while my results suggest that banks increase risk-taking in response to tax 
rate increases for shareholders able to use loss offsets, this implicitly assumes that these 
shareholders have an existing loss with which to offset the tax rate increase. Thus, to the extent 
that the mechanism behind the positive relation between shareholder tax rate increases and bank 
risk-taking is the loss offset as theory predicts, I expect this result to be concentrated in banks 
with a history of losses. Accordingly, I re-estimate my tests after partitioning my sample based 
on whether the bank has a history of at least one loss-year in the preceding ten-year period.33 I 
find a positive and significant relation between INCREASE_OFFSET and changes in ROAV 
banks with a history of at least one loss year (p < 0.10), but no evidence of a similar relation for 
ZSCORE or for banks without previous losses (p = 0.25) and differences in coefficients are not 
statistically significant (p = 0.53). Overall, this evidence is consistent with the positive relation 
 
32 Specifically, firm-specific (idiosyncratic) risk is generally eliminated with a portfolio size of between 10 to 15 
securities (Evans and Archer 1968). Thus, I re-estimate my tests after eliminating bank-year observations where the 
dominant shareholder has at least 10 outside ownership interests listed on the bank’s Y-6. 
33 I require banks to be S corporations at the time of the loss because shareholders cannot deduct losses incurred 
when the bank was a C corporation. To maximize variation in loss-years, I use a ten-year period when partitioning 
my sample, as only a small proportion of my sample have a history of losses (e.g., approximately 14 percent of my 
sample has at least one loss year in the preceding ten year-period). However, results are similar, albeit weaker, if I 
use a five year-period to partition my sample. In addition, given limited variation in INCREASE_NOOFFSET for 
banks with a history of losses, I omit this variable for both subsamples in these tests. However, results are similar if I 




between shareholder tax rate increases and bank risk-taking being concentrated, at least in part, 
by banks whose shareholders have existing loss offsets to offset their tax rate increases.34  
5.5. Financial Crisis Years 
 Although I control for state-by-year fixed effects in my analyses, it is possible that 
extreme levels of risk-taking around the financial crisis may influence my results. To address this 
possibility, I re-estimate my tests excluding crisis years (i.e., years 2007 through 2009).35 In 
contrast to my main results, I find no evidence of a significant association between increases in 
shareholders’ personal tax rates and ROA volatility and Z-Score for shareholders who can use 
loss offsets (p = 0.28), but a positive and significant relation for shareholders who cannot use 
loss offsets (p < 0.01). In addition, the coefficient on DECREASE is also negative and 
significant, suggesting that decreases in shareholder tax rates are negatively associated with bank 
risk-taking. Although inconsistent with my main findings, these results may be due to reduced 
power, given that my sample size and number of tax rate changes is each reduced approximately 
30 percent in these tests (untabulated).  
 
5.6. Other Robustness Tests 
 I also conduct several additional tests to ensure the robustness of my results. First, 
although almost all dominant shareholders in my sample are taxable individuals, approximately 
one percent are tax-exempt foundations, trust, or other non-taxable entities. Because banks with 
 
34 However, even without an existing loss, loss offsets may still lead to greater risk-taking to the extent shareholders 
are incentivized by the promise of a future loss offset.  
35 Similarly, it is possible that the effect of changes in shareholders’ personal taxes also vary during the financial 
crisis relative to other periods (Gallemore et al. 2017). In untabulated analysis, I re-estimate equation (2) after 
restricting my sample to only crisis years. I find no evidence of a relation between shareholder tax rate increases and 
decreases and either measure of bank risk-taking (p = 0.19). However, given the relatively limited variation in tax 




non-taxable dominant shareholders may be inherently different from banks whose largest 
shareholders are taxable individuals, I re-estimate my analyses after excluding these observations 
from my sample. Second and similarly, banks whose dominant shareholder lives in a state with 
an income tax (e.g., New Jersey) may also be inherently different from banks whose largest 
shareholder lives in a state without an income tax (e.g., Florida and Texas). Thus, I re-estimate 
my analyses after excluding observations where the largest shareholder lives in Alaska, Florida, 
Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, or Wyoming. Third, I re-estimate my analyses after 
separately excluding each shareholder state of residence to confirm that results are not driven by 
certain states.  
 Fourth, while my analyses use coarsened exact matching based on banks’ change in size, 
size squared, and headquarters’ state, I also re-estimate my analyses after matching on other 
dimensions: 1) matching on the bank headquarters’ state and changes in SIZE and PERSINC, the 
only statistically significant variable in OLS regressions of equation (2) (untabulated), 2) 
matching on changes in SIZE and LOANS and the bank headquarters’ state, 3) matching on 
lagged, raw values of SIZE, SIZE², and LOANS, and the headquarters’ state, 4) separately 
supplementing the current matched dimensions with each variable that is significantly different 
between treatment and control observations in Table 4.5, and 5) substituting the banks 
headquarters’ state for the interaction of headquarters’ state and year. Fifth, I repeat my analyses 
using entropy balancing rather than CEM to mitigate differences on observable dimensions 
between treatment and control observations (e.g., Hainmueller 2012). Results (untabulated) of all 





 In this study, I exploit plausibly exogenous changes in individual state income taxes and 
detailed ownership data from banks organized as S corporations to examine whether 
shareholders’ personal tax rate increases affect bank risk-taking. Despite the importance of risk-
taking to both bank profitability and long-term macroeconomic growth and rich economic theory 
underpinning the relation between personal taxes and investment risk-taking, there is limited 
understanding of how shareholder taxes affect banks’ risk-taking decisions.  
My findings suggest that shareholders’ personal taxes have an economically significant, 
positive effect on banks’ risk-taking decisions when shareholders can share in risk with the 
government via loss-offsets. This positive relation is concentrated in less-capitalized banks 
where the dominant shareholder is the bank’s CEO, external monitoring is lower, and there are 
relatively few conflicts among shareholders. In contrast, I find a negative relation between 
shareholder tax rate increases and bank risk-taking for better-capitalized banks with less external 
monitoring and fewer shareholder conflicts. Given the pervasiveness of shareholder taxes and the 
importance of risk-taking to banks specifically and the economy more generally, this study 
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VARIABLE DEFINITIONS  
Variable Definition 
BDSIZE The number of directors on the board. (Y6) 
CEOCHAIR An indicator variable set equal to one if the bank’s 
dominant shareholder is also CEO of the bank, and zero 
otherwise. (Y6) 
CONFLICT An indicator variable set equal to one if the bank’s number 
of shareholders is in the highest tercile of the distribution, 
and zero otherwise. (Y6) 
DECREASE The absolute value of the decrease in the highest statutory 
individual state income tax rate for the bank’s dominant 
shareholder. The highest statutory individual state income 
tax rate is adjusted for state deductibility of federal income 
taxes, if applicable, and assumes a filing status of married 
filing jointly. (Y6, CCH) 
DIV An indicator variable set equal to one if the dominant 
shareholder’s number of outside ownership interests is in 
the highest tercile of the distribution, and zero otherwise. 
(Y6) 
EXTAUDIT An indicator variable set equal to one if the bank holding 
company engaged in a full-scope independent external 
audit during the year, and zero otherwise. (C) 
HICAP An indicator variable set equal to one if the bank’s Tier 1 
capital ratio is in the highest tercile of the distribution, and 
zero otherwise. (C) 
INCREASE The absolute value of the increase in the highest statutory 
individual state income tax rate for the bank’s dominant 
shareholder. The highest statutory individual state income 
tax rate is adjusted for state deductibility of federal income 
taxes, if applicable, and assumes a filing status of married 
filing jointly. (Y6, CCH, TF) 
INCREASE_NOOFFSET The absolute value of the increase in the highest statutory 
individual state income tax rate for shareholders who 
cannot use loss offsets. Shareholders who cannot use loss 
offsets are those who either do not hold a role in BHC or 
bank or only hold one role that would not constitute full-
time employment under the passive loss activity limitations 
(e.g., if the shareholder only serves as a director, chairman, 
or secretary/treasurer) and do not have any other source of 
passive income. Shareholders who do not have another 
source of passive income are those with investments listed 




(e.g., as managers or other employees). The highest 
statutory individual state income tax rate is adjusted for 
state deductibility of federal income taxes, if applicable, 
and assumes a filing status of married filing jointly. (Y6, 
CCH, TF) 
INCREASE_OFFSET The absolute value of the increase in the highest statutory 
individual state income tax rate for shareholders who can 
use loss offsets. Shareholders who can use loss offsets are 
those who are the CEO or a non-CEO executive or officer 
of the BHC or bank (e.g., an executive vice president) or 
those who both have another source of passive income and 
either do not hold a role in BHC or bank or only hold one 
role that would not constitute full-time employment under 
the passive loss activity limitations. Shareholders who have 
another source of passive income are those with 
investments listed on FR Y-6 that are not also accompanied 
by full-time roles (e.g., as managers or other employees). 
The highest statutory individual state income tax rate is 
adjusted for state deductibility of federal income taxes, if 
applicable, and assumes a filing status of married filing 
jointly. (Y6, CCH, TF) 
INCREASE_OFFSET_CEO The absolute value of the increase in the highest statutory 
individual state income tax rate for shareholders who serve 
as the bank or BHC’s CEO. The highest statutory 
individual state income tax rate is adjusted for state 
deductibility of federal income taxes, if applicable, and 
assumes a filing status of married filing jointly. (Y6, CCH, 
TF) 
INCREASE_OFFSET_NONCEO The absolute value of the increase in the highest statutory 
individual state income tax rate for shareholders who are 
not the CEO of the bank or BHC. Non-CEO shareholders 
are either other executives, officers, or other employees of 
the BHC or bank (e.g., an executive vice president) or 
those who both have another source of passive income and 
either do not hold a role in BHC or bank or only hold one 
role that would not constitute full-time employment under 
the passive loss activity limitations. Shareholders who have 
another source of passive income are those with 
investments listed on FR Y-6 that are not also accompanied 
by full-time roles (e.g., as managers or other employees). 
The highest statutory individual state income tax rate is 
adjusted for state deductibility of federal income taxes, if 
applicable, and assumes a filing status of married filing 




LOANS Loan portfolio size at the end of year t, computed as total 
gross loans divided by total assets. (C) 
NCO Net charge-offs in year t divided by gross loans. (C) 
NIM Net interest margin, computed as total interest income less 
total interest expense divided by total average interest 
earning assets. (C) 
NPL Non-performing loans scaled by total loans, where non-
performing loans are defined as loans that are past due, 
have been modified in a troubled debt restructuring, or are 
in non-accrual status. (C) 
NUMSH The total number of shareholders listed on the Y-6 in a 
given year. (Y6) 
OWNINTS The total number of outside ownership interests for a given 
shareholder. (Y6) 
PERSINC Personal income per capita in year t for the county in 
which the bank is headquartered (in thousands). Personal 
income includes income from wages, proprietors’ income, 
dividends, interest, rents, and government benefits. 
Changes are computed as the percentage change in 
personal income from year t-1 to t. (BEA) 
ROA Return on assets, computed as pre-tax income divided by 
total assets. (C) 
ROAV Return on asset volatility, computed as the standard 
deviation of the difference between logged quarterly ROA 
and ROA for the same quarter of the previous year, 
computed over the four quarters in year t. (C) 
RWA Total risk-weighted assets scaled by total assets. (C) 
SHOWN The total ownership percentage for the dominant 
shareholder of the BHC. If more than one member of the 
same family is a shareholder, the family is treated as a 
group and ownership for all members of the family is 
added together. (Y6) 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets (in thousands) for the 
bank at the end of year t. (C) 
SIZE² The square of Size at the end of year t. (C) 
TIER1 Tier 1 capital ratio at the end of year t, computed as total 
Tier 1 capital divided by total assets. (C) 
TOTPOP The total population in year t for the county in which the 
bank is headquartered (in thousands). Changes are 
computed as the percentage change in total population 
from year t-1 to t. (BEA) 
UNEMP The unemployment rate in year t for the county in which 




ZSCORE The natural logarithm of the average of the bank’s ROA 
plus TIER1, computed over the four quarters in year t, 
scaled by ROAV, and multiplied by negative one. (C) 
 
Data Sources: 
BEA: BEA Local Area Personal Income Database 
BLS: BLS Local Area Unemployment Statistics Database 
C: Call Reports 
CCH: CCH State Tax Handbook  
SNL: SNL bank data 
TF: The Tax Foundation’s State Individual Income Tax Rate Data 
























































TAX RATE CHANGE CALCULATION AND VALIDATION  
This appendix provides further details for computing and validating shareholder tax rate 
changes. For each BHC in my sample, I first identify the dominant shareholder in each bank 
using voting power listed on the Y-6. For banks with family ownership, I treat the family as a 
group and compute total ownership as the sum of ownership of all members of the family. If two 
or more owners have the most voting power in the BHC, I assume that the dominant shareholder 
is the owner with the highest role, which I define using the 2017 Robert Half Salary Guide for 
Accounting and Finance. I link each dominant shareholder with their respective individual state 
tax rate using the shareholder’s state of residence listed on the Y-6 and the highest individual 
state tax rate hand-collected from CCH’s State Tax Handbook and data from the Tax 
Foundation.36 To the extent there are discrepancies between the two sources, I use state revenue 
department websites and individual state income tax codes to settle disputes. I adjust each tax 
rate for state deductibility of federal income taxes, if applicable, and assume a filing status of 
married filing jointly. 
To validate that the highest statutory state income tax rate is an appropriate measure for 
my sample, I randomly sample 30 bank-years and estimate each dominant shareholder’s total 
income using information included on the Y-6. Specifically, I first identify each shareholder’s 
highest role within the BHC or bank using the 2017 Robert Half Salary Guide for Accounting 
and Finance to rank each role. I then use Payscale.com’s and Indeed.com’s salary estimators to 
estimate salary for each role. To mitigate double counting salary for executives and officers with 
 




similar roles at the bank, I include salary for the highest role between the bank and BHC (e.g., if 
the shareholder is both the CEO and secretary, I include the compensation corresponding to just 
the CEO role). I also include any directorship, using BankDirectors.com’s Compensation Survey 
Summary Report to determine approximate compensation for the bank directors and chairmen 
(see McCormick 2019). 37 I CPI-adjust each amount using historical CPI adjustment factors from 
the BLS to derive approximate salary as of the date of the Y-6. When estimating each 
shareholder’s applicable I conduct extensive internet searches to identify each shareholder’s 
spouse. To the extent the shareholder’s spouse also works for the BHC or bank, I include the 
spouse’s salary, computed using the steps above; if the spouse is not employed by the bank, I set 
the spouse’s wages equal to the average compensation in the shareholder’s state and year using 
BEA data. 
Second, I include income from other employment outside the BHC and bank. The Y-6 
provides the name of other businesses in which the shareholder is a director, trustee, partner, or 
executive officer and the name and corresponding ownership stake of other businesses in which 
the shareholder owns 25 percent or more of the voting securities. Ideally, I would measure 
income from other employment by using each business’ tax returns to calculate either the 
shareholder’s salary or the shareholder’s pro-rata allocation of income or losses if these other 
businesses are flow-through entities. However, this information is generally not publicly 
available and time consuming to collect. Thus, for each dominant shareholder’s business listed 
on the Y-6, I use internet searches and salary information from Payscale.com and Indeed.com to 
approximate compensation and CPI-adjust each amount to the year of the Y-6. Some Y-6s state 
 
37 I do not use Payscale.com or Indeed.com to estimate salaries for directors because director salaries in these 
estimators are largely reflective of directors of public banks and thus grossly overstated relative to what directors of 




that their shareholders do not hold any other roles in other businesses, but these shareholders’ 
principal occupations list roles outside the BHC or bank (e.g., an shareholder who is chairman of 
the BHC’s board of directors may also be a dentist). In these cases, I assume that this is the 
shareholder’s other business and calculate the shareholder’s income using Payscale.com and 
Indeed.com, as described above. 
Finally, S corporation shareholders are taxed on their pro-rata share of the firm’s income, 
losses, and credits, regardless of whether the income is ultimately distributed. Thus, I also include the 
shareholder’s pro-rata share of the BHCs net income in my calculation. Specifically, I multiply the 
shareholder’s ownership percentage as listed on the Y-6 by the bank’s net income over my sample 
period. To arrive at total income, I compute the sum of the shareholder’s (and spouse’s, if 
applicable) BHC or bank salary, the spouse’s BEA income if applicable, income from other jobs, 
and the pro-rata share of bank income.38 I then compare each shareholder’s estimated income 
with their state’s top tax brackets in that year. For 26 of the 30 bank-years, the shareholder’s 
estimated income is within the state’s highest tax bracket, while the remaining four bank-years 
are in the second highest tax bracket. Thus, the highest statutory state income tax rate appears to 




38 I do not account for each shareholder’s distributions from the S corporation because I focus solely on changes in 
income taxes and shareholders of S corporations are taxed on their share of the S corporation’s tax items, regardless 
of whether the income was distributed. Thus, in general, a distribution to an S corporation shareholder does not 
cause the shareholder to recognize income. However, to the extent the shareholder’s distribution from the S 
corporation exceeds his or her basis in the S corporation stock, the excess will be taxed as a capital gain under IRC 
§1368(b). Alternatively, if the S corporation has earnings and profits (from previous years as a C corporation or 





LIST OF INDIVIDUAL STATE TAX RATE INCREASES DURING SAMPLE  
Panel A: Tax Rate Increases 
Year State Previous Rate New Rate Change 
2003 AL 3.07% 3.25% 0.18% 
2003 CT 4.50% 5.00% 0.50% 
2003 IA 5.51% 5.84% 0.32% 
2003 MO 3.68% 3.90% 0.22% 
2003 MT 6.75% 7.15% 0.40% 
2003 ND 3.40% 3.60% 0.20% 
2003 NE 6.68% 6.84% 0.16% 
2003 NY 6.85% 7.70% 0.85% 
2003 OR 5.53% 5.85% 0.32% 
2005 CA 9.30% 10.30% 1.00% 
2008 MD 4.75% 6.25% 1.50% 
2008 UT 4.54% 5.00% 0.46% 
2009 CA 10.30% 10.55% 0.25% 
2009 CT 5.00% 6.50% 1.50% 
2009 OK 3.58% 5.50% 1.93% 
2009 WI 6.75% 7.75% 1.00% 
2011 IL 3.00% 5.00% 2.00% 
2013 CA 10.30% 13.30% 3.00% 
2013 ND 2.59% 3.99% 1.40% 
2014 MN 7.85% 9.85% 2.00% 






LIST OF INDIVIDUAL STATE TAX RATE DECREASES DURING SAMPLE  
Year State Previous Rate New Rate Change 
2003 NM 8.20% 7.70% -0.50% 
2004 NM 7.70% 6.80% -0.90% 
2004 OK 7.00% 6.65% -0.35% 
2005 MT 7.15% 4.49% -2.67% 
2005 NM 6.80% 6.00% -0.80% 
2005 OH 7.50% 7.19% -0.32% 
2006 AZ 5.04% 4.79% -0.25% 
2006 NM 6.00% 5.30% -0.70% 
2006 NY 7.70% 6.85% -0.85% 
2006 OK 6.65% 4.06% -2.59% 
2006 UT 4.55% 4.54% -0.01% 
2007 AZ 4.79% 4.54% -0.25% 
2007 NC 8.25% 8.00% -0.25% 
2007 OK 4.06% 3.67% -0.39% 
2008 NM 5.30% 4.90% -0.40% 
2008 OK 3.67% 3.58% -0.10% 
2009 NC 8.00% 7.75% -0.25% 
2009 ND 3.60% 3.16% -0.44% 
2009 VT 9.50% 9.40% -0.10% 
2011 CA 10.55% 10.30% -0.25% 
2011 MD 6.25% 5.50% -0.75% 
2011 OH 6.24% 5.93% -0.32% 
2012 ID 7.80% 7.40% -0.40% 
2012 ND 3.16% 2.59% -0.57% 
2012 OK 5.50% 5.25% -0.25% 
2013 AL 3.25% 3.02% -0.23% 
2013 IA 5.84% 5.42% -0.41% 
2013 KS 6.45% 4.90% -1.55% 
2013 MO 3.90% 3.62% -0.28% 
2013 MT 4.49% 4.17% -0.32% 
2013 OR 6.44% 5.98% -0.46% 
2014 KS 4.90% 4.80% -0.10% 
2014 ND 3.99% 3.22% -0.77% 
2014 WI 7.75% 7.65% -0.10% 
Mean Change    -0.55% 
 
